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PREFACE
I’d like to start by acknowledging the sensitive nature of the abortion
controversy. Abortion is, and likely always will be, a divisive issue.
“One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges
of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life
and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and
seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking
and conclusions about abortion.”1
I have often been asked to explain why I defend abortion. After all, I
was raised Catholic and currently attend a private Catholic institution.
The answer is simple. My philosophy, my experiences, my religious
training, and my attitudes toward life are mine and mine alone and they
are not to be imposed on another person when they are making decisions
on whether to bear or beget a child.
I do not pretend to know the answer of when life begins. “When those
trained in the disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus,” I am in no position to speculate as to
the answer. But how I feel about abortion should have no bearing on a
person making a decision as important as this one.
I defend abortion because it is a constitutionally protected right and has
been since Roe was decided in 1973 and reaffirmed nineteen years later
in Casey. I defend abortion because it is repeatedly under attack.2 I
defend abortion because I believe in bodily autonomy and reproductive
freedom and a person’s right to choose.
INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2020, the novel Coronavirus Disease, COVID-19, was
declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization.3 COVID-19 is
a highly contagious and life-threatening respiratory disease caused by
SARS-CoV-2 and transmitted through respiratory transmission,
including droplet and possibly aerosolized transmission, and the touching
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
2. See id. at 159.
3. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—-11-march-2020 [https://perma.
cc/M32P-NXSQ] (declaring the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic and calling on countries to scale
up emergency response mechanisms).
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of contaminated surfaces.4 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) reports that there have been over thirteen million
cases of COVID-19 and over 250,000 deaths across the nation since the
first confirmed case reported in the United States in late January 2020.5
Within the first week of 2021, the CDC reported that Texas saw a total of
1,843,153 confirmed cases.6 As COVID-19 infected our nation, states
were quick to issue executive orders restricting various aspects of daily
life under the pretense of public safety.7 It was clear at the outset that
certain civil liberties were going to be tested.8 Among them, a woman’s
constitutional right to an abortion.9
On March 22, 2020, in response to the pandemic, Texas Governor Greg
Abbott issued Executive Order GA-09.10 The order pertained to
preserving hospital capacity and postponing non-essential surgeries and
procedures until 11:59 p.m. on April 21, 2020.11 The language of the
order stated surgeries and procedures to be postponed were those deemed,
“not immediately medically necessary to correct a serious medical
condition, or to preserve the life of a patient who without immediate
4. See Ranjan K. Mohapatra et al., The Recent Challenges of Highly Contagious COVID19, Causing Respiratory Infections: Symptoms, Diagnosis, Transmission, Possible Vaccines,
Animal Models, and Immunotherapy, 96 CHEM. BIOLOGY & DRUG DESIGN 1187, 1188 (2020)
(expanding on the origin, transmission, symptoms, and diagnosis of the coronavirus).
5. See United States COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Laboratory Testing (NAATs) by State,
Territory, and Jurisdiction, CDC, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100kla
st7days [https://perma.cc/33GV-VHPK] (last updated Oct. 16, 2021) (providing the number of
COVID-19 cases by state).
6. See id. (identifying the total number of confirmed coronavirus cases in Texas).
7. See Stay at Home: These States Have Issued Orders for Residents Not to Go Out Amid
COVID-19 Pandemic, FOX10 PHX., https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/stay-at-home-thesestates-have-issued-orders-for-residents-not-to-go-out-amid-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/
VA66-4QWX] (last updated April 9, 2020) (providing a list of states where executive orders have
been issued ordering or encouraging residents to stay at home due to health and safety concerns).
8. See, e.g., Laurie Sobel et al., State Action to Limit Abortion Access During the COVID19 Pandemic, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid19/issue-brief/state-action-to-limit-abortion-access-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.
cc/WSB9-VE2X] (describing how states justify the ban on abortion due to the COVID-19
pandemic).
9. See id. (discussing the limited accessibility of abortions in states that have imposed
restrictions due to the pandemic).
10. See The Governor of the State of Tex., Exec. Order No. GA-09, 45 Tex. Reg. 2271,
2272 (2020) [hereinafter GA-09] (referring to Chapter 81 of the Texas Health and Safety Code’s
definition of a public health disaster).
11. See id. (stalling surgeries and procedures not “immediately medically necessary”).
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performance of the surgery or procedure would be at risk for serious
adverse medical consequences or death.”12
Physicians and medical professionals who violated the law were
subject to criminal penalties, including fines up to $1,000 and
imprisonment for up to 180 days.13 The day after Governor Abbott gave
the order, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton issued a press release
stating that the prohibition applied to all surgeries and procedures,
including any type of abortion that was not necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.14
Across the nation, other states issued similar orders that attempted to
restrict abortion access: Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio,
Tennessee, and West Virginia.15 Three days after Executive Order GA09 was issued, several Texas abortion providers filed suit in federal
district court in response to Paxton’s interpretation of the order.16 The
providers sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting GA-09 from
applying to medication and procedural abortions, which the district court
granted.17 Governor Abbott and state officials subsequently petitioned

12. Id.
13. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 418.173 (creating a penalty for violation of an emergency
management plan).
14. See Press Release, Ken Paxton, Att’y Gen., Health Care Professionals and Facilities,
Including Abortion Providers, Must Immediately Stop All Medically Unnecessary Surgeries and
Procedures to Preserve Resources to Fight COVID-19 Pandemic, (Mar. 23, 2020),
(https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/health-care-professionals-and-facilities-incl
uding-abortion-providers-must-immediately-stop-all) [https://perma.cc/77QY-3N8E] [hereinafter
Medically Unnecessary Surgeries] (warning that the prohibition on all medically unnecessary
surgeries, including abortion procedures, applies throughout the State).
15. See Jessica Glenza, States Use Coronavirus to Ban Abortions, Leaving Women
Desperate: ‘You Can’t Pause a Pregnancy,’ GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/30/us-states-ban-abortions-coronavirus-leave-women-desperate
[https://perma.cc/V38W-3DFD] (conveying the American Medical Association’s view that state
abortion restrictions are exploiting the pandemic).
16. See M. Tyler Gillett, Texas Providers File Lawsuit Against Executive Order Banning
Abortions, JURIST (Mar. 26, 2020, 5:44 AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/03/texasproviders-file-lawsuit-against-executive-order-banning-abortions/
[https://perma.cc/5HSL-DW
DU] (detailing the procedural litigation that ensued after Executive Order GA-09 was issued).
17. See Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. Abbott, 450 F. Supp.3d 753, 757 (W.D.
Tex. 2020) (issuing a temporary restraining order based on the findings that plaintiffs can show
“(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm if the temporary
relief is not granted, (3) that the injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs any harm the temporary relief
might cause Defendants, and (4) that a temporary restraining order will not disserve the public
interest.”).
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for a writ of mandamus to the Fifth Circuit and filed an emergency motion
to stay the district court’s order.18 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that
the district court had “abused its discretion by failing to apply the
framework governing emergency exercises of state authority during a
public health crisis.”19
This comment provides an overview of the litigation that ensued
following the issuance of Executive Order GA-09 and focuses on the
unprecedented restriction to a woman’s right to an abortion under the
guise of public safety. It will attempt to address the legitimacy of the
“public health concerns” listed in executive orders issued throughout
numerous states and will discuss the pertinent legal framework and
judicial scrutiny to apply.
I. A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO AN ABORTION
The issue of a woman’s constitutional right to abortion was decided in
Roe v. Wade, wherein the Supreme Court established the trimester
framework and announced that a state’s interest in potential life begins at
viability, not before.20 Nineteen years later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a woman’s constitutional right to abortion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.21 The Court in Casey, however, rejected the
trimester construct in Roe and held a woman’s liberty is not as
unlimited.22 Casey clarified that a state’s interest in potential life has
sufficient force to restrict a woman’s right to an abortion before viability
so long as it does not place an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make

18. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2020) (issuing a writ of mandamus based
on the extraordinary nature of the COVID-19 pandemic and the state’s interest in protecting public
health).
19. Id. at 783; see also David Lee, Fifth Circuit Lets Texas Limit Abortions During Covid19 Crisis, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/fifthcircuit-rules-texas-can-restrict-medication-abortions-during-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/5U
QD-825B] (announcing the Fifth Circuit’s decision to restore Texas’ ban on most abortions during
pandemic).
20. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (determining that a state’s legitimate
interest in potential life begins at viability).
21. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879
(1992) (reasoning that the adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central
holding of Roe v. Wade).
22. See id. at 872 (modifying Roe by holding that a state can express its concern for potential
life prior to fetal viability).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol24/iss1/1

6

Gonzalez: Abortion During a Public Health Crisis

2022]

RIGHT TO ABORTION DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS

7

that decision.23 Therefore, a statute which furthers a valid state interest
but has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice, is an undue burden, and cannot be considered a
permissible means of serving its legitimate interests.24 The Court held
that the new “undue burden” analysis did not disturb the central holding
in Roe, regardless of whether exceptions were made for specific
circumstances.25
COVID-19 introduced an unprecedented challenge to a woman’s
constitutional right to an abortion during a public health crisis.26
According to the Fifth Circuit, the applicable legal framework to apply to
the question of whether a state may restrict access to a pre-viability
abortion during a pandemic was set out in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.27 In Jacobson, the Supreme Court considered a 1905
Massachusetts compulsory regulation that required citizens to get
vaccinated in an attempt to combat a smallpox epidemic.28 The
defendant argued that the regulation violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights, but the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the liberty to be
secured by the Constitution does not import an absolute right free from
restraint.29 The Court went on to say a state may exercise its police
power to enact quarantine and health laws related to and protecting public

23. See id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s
ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause.”).
24. See id. at 878 (explaining that a finding of an undue burden standard is equivalent to a
state regulation that has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion).
25. See id. at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
26. See Joanna L. Grossman & Mary Ziegler, Unconstitutional Chaos: Abortion in the Time
of COVID-19, JUSTICIA: VERDICT (Apr. 15, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/04/15/
unconstitutional-chaos-abortion-in-the-time-of-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/DE3X-FYHQ]
(describing the effects state executive orders had on abortion access during the pandemic).
27. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 2020) (declaring the restriction of abortion
access during a public health crisis must be analyzed under the standards set out in Jacobson v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
28. See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11–12 (1905) (considering the
constitutionality of a state’s compulsory vaccination laws during a smallpox outbreak).
29. See id. at 26 (“There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good.”).
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health and safety.30 Relying on Jacobson, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
“all constitutional rights may be reasonably restricted to combat a public
health emergency” and that abortion is no exception.31
The question then turns to whether these two distinct legal standards
are diametrically opposed to one another or whether the language set out
in Jacobson must be reconciled with more recent cases concerning a
woman’s constitutional right to abortion.32 I examine each of these
distinct legal standards in further detail.
II. JACOBSON AND A STATE’S POLICE POWERS
Although Jacobson established state authority during a public health
crisis, it also set out the instance in which a court could review the actions
of a legislature.33 The Court appeared to anticipate a state’s ability to
abuse its police power and deemed it appropriate to clarify that if the state
exerted its police power in an arbitrary and oppressive manner, it would
justify interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.34 The
Supreme Court cautioned:
[I]f a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to
[that] object, or is beyond all question, a plain palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge
and thereby give effect to the Constitution.35

30. See id. at 38 (holding that a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic
of disease which threatens the safety of its members).
31. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 786.
32. Cf. Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the
Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 194 (2020)
(recognizing the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on a Supreme Court decision which the Fifth Circuit uses
to support their claim that Jacobson relaxes standards of scrutiny was misled.) (“The Supreme
Court has never said that Jacobson applies to all constitutional rights.”).
33. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31 (allowing judiciary review of legislative acts purporting to
relate to the welfare of the state when such acts have no real or substantial relationship to the welfare
of the state or its citizens).
34. See id. 38 (emphasizing instances for judicial intervention).
35. Id. at 31 (first quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661(1887); then quoting
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 320 (1890); and then quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207,
223 (1903)).
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Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit determined the district court had
“usurped the state’s authority to craft emergency health measures,”36
and the proper inquiries under Jacobson would consider whether
1) GA-09 lacked a real or substantial relation to the COVID-19 crisis, and
2) whether GA-09 was beyond question, in palpable conflict with the
Constitution.37 After applying Jacobson, the Fifth Circuit held
Executive Order GA-09 was not an outright ban on pre-viability abortions
but rather a “temporary postponement” on “non-essential abortions” that
bore a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis and was not,
beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitution.38
A. Whether Restricting Access to Abortion Bears a Real or Substantial
Relation to Combatting COVID-19
The first Jacobson inquiry asks whether GA-09 lacks a “real or
substantial relation” to the crisis Texas faces.39 GA-09’s purported
purpose was to allow for maximum hospital capacity in anticipation of
those affected by the virus and to maintain a supply of personal protective
equipment (“PPE”).40 PPE refers to N95 respirators, surgical masks,
non-sterile and sterile gloves, disposable protective eyewear, gowns, and
hair and shoe covers.41 According to GA-09, a shortage of hospital
capacity or PPE would hinder efforts to cope with COVID-19.42 While
it is undeniably true that a shortage of hospital capacity would hinder
COVID-19 efforts, both medication and procedural abortions afforded to

36. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussing deference afforded to
the states and implying that the district court substituted its own view of the efficacy of GA-09).
37. See id. (suggesting courts may not second-guess the wisdom or efficacy of the measures
taken by a state’s response to emergency measures).
38. See id. at 788 (stressing that those characteristics, which the district court failed to
mention, placed GA-09 in contrast with restrictions set out in prior court decisions).
39. See Jacobson 197 U.S. at 31 (cautioning that statutes that have no real or substantial
relation warrant judicial intervention); see also In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 787 (describing the current
state of the Texas public health crisis).
40. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271 (claiming hospital capacity and personal protective
equipment were being depleted by unnecessary surgeries and procedures).
41. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 794 (discussing the PPE required for procedural abortions
and stating abortion is a common procedure in Texas).
42. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271 (acknowledging the need for increased amounts of
protective equipment, such as masks, to combat COVID-19).
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women seeking to terminate a pre-viable pregnancy are not typically
performed in hospitals but instead in clinical out-patient settings.43
Typically, pregnancy is measured from the first day of a pregnant
woman’s last menstrual period (“LMP”).44 Texas prohibits abortion
after twenty weeks from the first day of the pregnant woman’s LMP.45
Up until ten weeks LMP, women wishing to terminate their pregnancy
can choose between medication abortion46 and procedural abortion.47
Texas restricts medication abortion to the first ten weeks of pregnancy,
and after ten weeks, only procedural abortion is available.48 Past sixteen
weeks, only a licensed ambulatory surgical center or hospital may
perform an abortion.49 “[P]rocedural abortion is not what is commonly
understood to be ‘surgery’[.]50 It involves no incision, no need for
general anesthesia, and no requirement of a sterile field.”51

43. See Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Eng’g, & Med., The Safety and Quality of Abortion Care in the
United States, NCBI (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK507229/ [https://perma.cc/
38K5-MBCH] (reporting fewer than five percent of abortions were provided in hospitals in 2014).
44. See Natalia Viarenich, M.D., Gestational Age: How Do You Count Pregnancy Weeks?,
FLO, https://flo.health/pregnancy/week-by-week/gestational-age [https://perma.cc/W68M-LGNQ]
(last updated Mar. 10, 2021) (defining gestational age as a way to determine how far along a
pregnancy is).
45. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.044 (forbidding abortion once the probable
post-fertilization age of the fetus is twenty or more weeks).
46. See How Does the Abortion Pill Work?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned
parenthood.org/learn/abortion/the-abortion-pill/how-does-the-abortion-pill-work [https://perma.cc
/BG82-E4RY] (explaining how the “abortion pill” is actually a misnomer because there are two
pills one must take. The first pill, called mifepristone, stops the pregnancy from growing.
The second pill, misoprostol, helps expel the pregnancy.).
47. See Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. Abbott, 450 F. Supp.3d 753, 757 (W.D.
Tex. 2020) (“Under the attorney general’s interpretation, the Executive Order either bans all nonemergency abortions in Texas or bans all non-emergency abortions in Texas starting at 10 weeks
of pregnancy, and even earlier among patients whom medication abortion is not appropriate.”);
see also In-Clinic Abortion, PLANNED PARENTHOOD https://www.plannedparenthood.org/up
loads/filer_public/38/e0/38e00243-38bc-4e36-be90-745285238985/in_clinic_abortion_informatio
n-.pdf [https://perma.cc/535X-N5KY] (describing the differences between aspiration abortion and
D&E abortion, where a clinician uses gentle suction at times accompanied with medical tools to
empty the patient’s uterus).
48. See generally Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.063 (ordering that only a physician
may administer the abortion-inducing drug after assessing the pregnant woman).
49. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.004 (establishing the specific requirements
on when and where an abortion may be performed).
50. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 6, In re
Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), (No. A-20-CV-323-LY), 2020 WL 1815587.
51. Id.
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The only abortions required in ambulatory surgical centers or hospitals
are those past sixteen weeks LMP.52 Furthermore, abortion providers in
this suit declared they were taking measures to protect the health and
safety of patients and staff by: screening patients for COVID-19
symptoms before each visit, reducing patient volume, and/or increasing
appointment spacing between patients to comply with social distancing
precautions.53 Abortion providers also required patients to wait in their
cars rather than in the waiting room after checking in for an appointment,
and also implemented techniques to minimize PPE use.54 Compulsory
pregnancy equates to more, not less medical care.55
Even if concerns of sufficient PPE were legitimate, Governor Abbott
announced in a press conference—held while GA-09 was in effect—that
there were “more than 20,000 hospital beds available with 2,448 intensive
care unit beds available and 7,834 ventilators.”56 Abbott also stated that
Texas companies had stepped up to increase PPE production by
distributing more than three million masks, four million gloves, and
78,000 coveralls to health care facilities.57 Moreover, on March 31, 2020
52. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.004 (requiring abortions be performed in
certain hospitals and surgical centers after sixteen weeks since a woman’s last menstrual period).
53. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 51, In re Greg
Abbott, et al, (No. 1:20-cv-00323-LY), 2020 WL 1815587 at 17 (underscoring the commitment
Plaintiffs have made in responding to the current public health crisis, including preserving medical
resources in short supply during the pandemic).
54. See id. at 17 (implementing additional COVID-19 precautions to ensure the health and
safety of Plaintiffs’ patients); see also Jordan Smith, Abortion Providers File Emergency Lawsuit
Challenging Texas Coronavirus Restrictions, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:55 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/03/26/coronavirus-texas-abortion-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/Y5U3ATB7] (suggesting abortion providers had taken precautions to maximize safety and limit PPE
since the beginning of the outbreak).
55. See Daniel Grossman, Abortions Don’t Drain Hospital Resources, BOS. REV. (Apr. 17,
2020), https://bostonreview.net/science-nature-politics-law-justice/daniel-grossman-abortions-do
nt-drain-hospital-resources [https://perma.cc/EA36-GE7A] (narrating a gynecologist’s routine
when providing a first trimester abortion, noting the PPE required. The gynecologist compares the
amount used for continued pregnancies and declares more PPE will be used, not less.).
56. Shawna M. Reding & Sammy Turner, Executive Order Regarding Texas Businesses
Reopening Could Be Coming, Gov. Greg Abbott Says, KVUE (Apr. 10, 2020, 2:32 PM),
https://www.kvue.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/coronavirus-texas-covid19-cases-update/2
69-f1c36a64-eedc-4d08-bf40-97c62ffcb39b [https://perma.cc/NJY7-XQNU].
57. See Press Release, Off. of the Tex. Governor, Governor Abbott Announces Incoming
Shipments of PPE, Provides Update on Distrib. in Tex. (Apr. 6, 2020), (https://gov.texas.
gov/news/post/governor-abbott-announces-incoming-shipments-of-ppe-provides-update-on-distri
bution-in-texas) [https://perma.cc/2N6S-CQ52] (announcing PPE to be received in the coming
weeks).
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(nine days after GA-09 was issued), Abbott issued Executive Order GA14 relating to the statewide continuity of essential services and activities
during the COVID-19 disaster, which included religious services
conducted in churches, congregations, and houses of worship.58
Furthermore, on April 17, 2020, Abbott issued several executive orders
to coincide with the first phase of his plan to reopen Texas.59 Loosening
restrictions on businesses and religious services creates a heightened risk
of exposure that could—and ultimately did—lead to a surge in
hospitalizations, which in turn required use of PPE.60
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that while GA-09 was a drastic
measure, the order aligned with those similarly passed by other states.61

58. See Proclamation, Off. of the Tex. Governor, Governor Abbott Issues Exec. Ord.
Implementing Essential Serv. & Activities Protocols (Mar. 31, 2020), https://gov.texas.
gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issues-executive-order-implementing-essential-services-and-activ
ities-protocols [https://perma.cc/Y96U-FUUB] (defining as essential services, among other things,
religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and houses of worship); see also Tara
Haelle, Texas Governor Says Attending Church is ‘Essential’ but Abortions Can Wait Indefinitely,
FORBES (Apr. 1, 2020, 6:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/2020/04/01/texasgovernor-says-attending-church-is-essential-but-abortions-can-wait-indefinitely/#19769a488ab3
[https://perma.cc/2CT5-YWLY] (asserting that both free exercise of religion and a woman’s right
to terminate pregnancy are constitutionally guaranteed but only the former is accommodated for).
59. See Executive Orders by Governor Greg Abbott, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR.,
https://lrl.texas.gov/legeLeaders/governors/displayDocs.cfm?govdoctypeID=5&governorID=45
[https://perma.cc/P7ZN-JUCB] (providing a list of all executive orders issued by Governor
Greg Abbott beginning March of 2016 to the present date); see also Brittany Taylor, Gov. Abbott
Says He Will Sign Executive Order Next Week on How Texas Businesses Will Begin to Reopen,
CLICK2HOUSTON (Apr. 10, 2020, 2:09 PM), https://www.click2houston.com/news/exas/
2020/04/10/live-gov-abbott-to-provide-coronavirus-update/
[https://perma.cc/EP23-JCDT]
(discussing the possibility of reopening businesses in the state).
60. See Fadel Allassan, Texas Pauses Its Reopening as Coronavirus Cases Surge, AXIOS,
https://www.axios.com/texas-governor-suspends-elective-surgeries-bc5621ea-4e2b-4bd7-a05e-b5
6bd8bdcedd.html [https://perma.cc/PJ39-L46Q] (last updated June 25, 2020) (reporting Governor
Abbott once again suspended elective surgeries to ensure hospitals continue to have the ability to
treat COVID-19 patients); see also Corky Siemaszko, Texas Pauses Reopening as Hospitals
Inundated with ‘Explosion’ of COVID-19 Cases, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2020, 11:04 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/texas-governor-pauses-state-s-reopening-due-spike-new
-covid-n1232118 [https://perma.cc/9YT2-Y6DF] (quoting Governor Abbott as saying, “the last
thing we want to do as a state is go backwards and close down business.” State officials reported a
daily record of nearly 6,000 infections.).
61. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 787 (5th Cir. 2020) (observing that while these measures
would be constitutionally intolerable in ordinary times, they’re recognized as appropriate, and even
necessary, during the coronavirus pandemic due to the risk of transmission).
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Oklahoma, Ohio, and Alabama all passed similar orders.62 Those orders
equally brought concerns and claims of Fourteenth Amendment
violations.63 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma held that while the current public health emergency allowed
the state to impose some measure, the state’s police power is not
unfettered.64 There, the district court held that the executive order in
question would deny the Fourteenth Amendment right to abortion access
and the prohibition on medication abortion was improper under both
Jacobson and Casey.65 It went on to say the state acted in an
unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive way and imposed an undue
burden on abortion access.66 Similarly, the Alabama State Public Health
Officer set forth an order restricting all surgical procedures subject to
emergency exceptions.67 There, the state’s attorney general interpreted
the order as implementing a blanket postponement on all abortions,
medication or procedural, that were not necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.68 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama held that because Alabama law imposes time limits
on when women can obtain abortions, the required delay may have posed
an undue burden that was not justified by the state’s purported
rationales.69
62. See id. at 796–97 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (listing states that have attempted to limit
access to abortion in response to the COVID-19 pandemic).
63. See Temporary Restraining Order at 2, S. Wind Women’s Ctr. v. Stitt, (W.D. Okla.)
(No. CIV-20-277-G), 2020 WL 1677094, at *2–3, appeal dismissed, 808 F. App’x 677 (10th Cir.
2020) (reviewing the validity of an Oklahoma executive order limiting access to abortion, which
was enacted in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency); see also Robinson v. Marshall,
450 F.Supp.3d 1293, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2020), stay granted, order amended, No. 2:19CV365-MHT,
2020 WL 1659700 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 2020) (issuing a temporary restraining order to enjoin a
Alabama public health order which postponed abortion).
64. See Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 63, at 1 (stating that although a court
should not substitute its opinion for that of the legislatures, it also shouldn’t sanction invasion of
rights).
65. See id. at 6 (concluding that the executive order was invalid as an unreasonable use of
the state’s emergency powers and invalid as an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion).
66. See id. at 2 (stressing that the measures taken in delaying abortion procedures in effect
denied access to abortion).
67. See generally Robinson, 450 F.Supp.3d at 1296 (pertaining to an Alabama state order
mandating postponement of surgeries, including abortion).
68. Id. (reiterating the state’s argument that the order’s constitutionality rested upon its
emergency powers).
69. Id. (noting the order was, “likely to fully prevent some women from exercising their
right to obtain an abortion.”).
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Although GA-09 was undoubtedly enacted due to the state’s interest in
combatting the COVID-19 pandemic, the state’s insistence that
preventing women from obtaining an abortion furthers that interest goes
beyond the necessity of the case considering (1) the amount of PPE used
for abortions, (2) the locations that perform abortions, and (3) the
measures implemented at abortion clinics to maximize patient and staff
health and safety.70 If a state were truly interested in combatting the
pandemic, it would not force a woman already under a time constraint to
seek refuge in another state, further imposing additional risks associated
with travel.71 A Colorado abortion provider stated they had patients
travel as far as fifteen hours by car to get an available appointment solely
to obtain a medication abortion.72 In Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., the United States District
Court of Maryland issued a nationwide injunction against an FDA
regulation which required women to obtain medication used to induce an
abortion in person.73 There, the court held the burdens of the in-person
requirement in light of the COVID-19 pandemic were significant and
likely to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice.74

70. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 55 (rejecting the notion that abortions deplete PPE or
hospital space); see also Jen Villavicencio, Opinion: I’m an OB-GBYN. Halting Abortions Won’t
Help Supply Shortage, BRIDGE MICH. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.bridgemi.com/guestcommentary/opinion-im-ob-gyn-halting-abortions-wont-help-supply-shortage [https://perma.cc/
V4V2-YXNH] (listing the PPE needed for medication and procedural abortions).
71. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 472 F.
Supp. 3d 183, 196 (D. Md. 2020) (relying on expert opinions regarding additional risks associated
with travel including stops at gas stations, restrooms, public transportation, and sharing an enclosed
car with others).
72. See Claire Cleveland, Colorado’s Abortion Providers See More Out-of-State Patients
During the Coronavirus Pandemic, CPR NEWS (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.cpr.org/2020/04/
15/colorado-abortion-providers-are-seeing-more-out-of-state-patients-during-the-coronavirus-pan
demic/ [https://perma.cc/63QE-DTYG] (“Medication abortion is typically a very straight forward
process . . . [t]he fact that that individual had to go through so much to obtain something that is
typically a very straightforward process. It was just heart wrenching.”).
73. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists., 472 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (finding
plaintiffs had satisfied all four required elements to grant a preliminary injunction after presenting
extensive evidence to support the “common sense inference” that the burdens of the in-person
requirement during the pandemic presented a substantial obstacle).
74. See id. at 211–23 (considering a range of relevant factors including, “increases in travel
distance or time to an abortion facility, greater difficulties in securing transportation to the facility,
the need to arrange for childcare during visits relating to abortion procedures, additional costs
associated with the abortion, the ability of abortion providers to keep up with patient demand and
other practical considerations in light of the reality on the ground.”).
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It cannot be said that preventing a woman from obtaining an abortion
in a clinical setting—with little to no PPE—bears a real or substantial
relationship to the state’s purported interests of maximum hospital
capacity and PPE preservation.75
B. Whether There is a Plain and Palpable Invasion of a Constitutional
Right
Although the Fifth Circuit held the applicable framework governing
emergency exercises of state authority during a public health crisis was
established in Jacobson, laws that violate rights secured by the
Constitution are invalid.76 According to the Fifth Circuit, the district
court erred in determining that GA-09 conflicted with the Constitution
because it grossly misread GA-09 as, “an ‘outright ban’ on all previability abortions.”77 Instead, the Fifth Circuit attempted to reason that
GA-09 was not a ban but rather a mere postponement of certain nonessential abortions.78
If we accept the Fifth Circuit’s contention that the executive order is
a mere postponement of non-essential abortions, under GA-09,
“non-essential abortions” would include abortion surgeries and
procedures that do not deplete PPE, and are not immediately medically
necessary to correct a serious medical condition or preserve the life of a

75. See Lauren Young, ‘Not the Time to Play Politics’: The False Premise Behind Texas’
Anti-Abortion COVID-19 Order, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (Mar. 27, 2020, 2:06 PM), https://rewire.
news/article/2020/03/27/not-the-time-to-play-politics-the-false-premise-behind-texas-anti-abortio
n-covid-19-order/ [https://perma.cc/5SZQ-U3CA] (asserting GA-09 was made in bad faith
considering reproductive clinics rarely need the equipment in demand at hospitals).
76. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (distinguishing a state’s attempt
to pass laws that regulated transportation of cattle brought within its limits for the purpose of
preventing infectious diseases from entering the state. The regulation was deemed an invalid
exercise of police power because it went beyond the necessity of the case, invaded federal authority,
and violated rights secured by the Constitution. (citing Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S.
465, 471–73 (1877)).
77. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 788 (5th Cir. 2020) (opining GA-09 was not an outright
ban because it differed in three key respects to other regulations which were held to be invalid.
According to the Fifth Circuit, GA-09 was not an outright ban because it was set to expire, included
an emergency exception, and contained a separate exception for procedures that would not deplete
hospital capacity or PPE.).
78. See id. at 788 (reasoning that because GA-09 had an expiration date, it could not be a
ban).
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patient.79 In effect, every woman seeking an abortion in Texas would
either need to 1) be at the stage of pregnancy where they could receive a
drug-induced abortion with no PPE required, or 2) be on the verge of a
serious medical condition.80 But those emergency exceptions are at odds
with abortion constitutional doctrine, which states that regardless of
whether exceptions are made for certain circumstances, a state may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her
pregnancy before viability.81 Furthermore, “the proper focus of
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not
the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”82
The Fifth Circuit ironically proclaimed the ban was only temporary,
and that time was of the essence when combatting COVID-19.83 The
order went into effect on March 22, 2020, and expired at 11:59 p.m. on
April 21, 2020.84 However, the state could have modified or extended
the order.85 This kept a woman from exercising her right to an abortion
for an entire month merely because she had not manifested a severe
adverse medical condition.86 The American College of Obstetricians and

79. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (setting out the applicable procedures to be
performed and their exceptions); see also In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 788 (explaining the order
contains a broad exception for procedures that would not deplete medical resources).
80. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (instructing health care professionals and
licensed health care facilities to postpone surgeries not immediately medically necessary);
see also Medically Unnecessary Surgeries, supra note 14 (announcing unnecessary surgeries and
procedures to include any type of abortion).
81. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837
(1992) (revealing several guiding principles for the undue burden test).
82. See id. at 894 (explaining that while the spousal requirement at issue would not impose
a burden for all women, the burden imposed by legislation is measured by the impact on those it
does affect).
83. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 794 (citing the rise of confirmed COVID-19 cases as a
justification for the state’s inability to wait until the expiration of the temporary restraining order).
84. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (decreeing the order was to remain in effect
and in full force unless modified, amended, rescinded, or superseded).
85. See Emma Platoff, Texas Can Enforce Abortion Ban During Coronavirus Pandemic,
Federal Appeals Court Rules, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2020/04/07/texas-abortion-ban-can-remain-place-during-coronavirus-court-rules/ [https://perma.
cc/ZTC5-TJJA] (highlighting that prohibiting abortion for any period of time would leave many
unable to terminate their pregnancies at all).
86. See María Méndez, The Fight Over Texas’ Abortion Ban During the COVID-19
Pandemic is Over, but What Did It All Mean?, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 28, 2020, 1:40 PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/public-health/2020/04/28/the-fight-over-texas-abortion-ban-
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Gynecologists, along with others, released a statement regarding delaying
abortion procedures,87 wherein they stated abortion is, “a time-sensitive
service for which a delay of several weeks, or in some cases days, may
increase the risks or potentially make it completely inaccessible.”88
What the Fifth Circuit failed to realize is that a “mere postponement”
easily manifests itself into an outright ban if a woman is kept waiting long
enough along her pregnancy so that her constitutional right to abortion is
no longer afforded to her.89
The fact of the matter is that this order and others like it attempt to
prevent women from exercising their right to obtain an abortion, and they
do so under the illusion of public health.90 Orders like GA-09 prevent a
woman from accessing abortion within her state, force her to travel to a
neighboring state without similar restrictions, or wait until the state
rescinds the order.91 They place an undue burden on her choice to

during-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-over-but-what-did-it-all-mean/ [https://perma.cc/Q7Q8-GZ85]
(discussing the effects and impact of not having access to abortion).
87. See Joint Statement on Abortion Access During the COVID-19 Outbreak, AM. COLL.
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/
2020/03/joint-statement-on-abortion-access-during-the-covid-19-outbreak
[https://perma.cc/87
FQ-FB65] (asserting abortion should not be categorized as a non-essential procedure).
88. See id. (illustrating the consequences of being unable to procure an abortion).
89. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 803 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is
painfully obvious that a delayed abortion procedure could easily amount to a total denial of that
constitutional right: If currently scheduled abortions are postponed, many women will miss the
small window of opportunity they have to access a legal abortion.”).
90. See Emma Day, The Coronavirus Is a Flimsy Excuse to Ban Abortion, WASH. POST
(Apr. 8, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/08/covid-19-isflimsy-excuse-ban-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/PH98-2PLB] (insinuating states took advantage of
the situation to limit abortion access); see also Katelyn Burns, Republicans Are Using the Pandemic
to Push Anti-abortion and Anti-trans Agendas, VOX (Mar. 26, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.
vox.com/2020/3/26/21195308/republicans-coronavirus-anti-abortion-trans [https://perma.cc/5K
GN-X32M] (accusing Ken Paxton of exploiting the pandemic to end abortion in the state); see also
Ashoka Mukpo, Defying Medical Experts, Lawmakers Are Weaponizing COVID-19 to Restrict
Abortion Access; ACLU (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/reproductive-freedom/
defying-medical-experts-lawmakers-are-weaponizing-covid-19-to-restrict-abortion-access/ [https:
//perma.cc/G95E-F3WD] (suggesting the pandemic is a cover that is helping conservatives
accomplish their objective to eliminate abortion access).
91. See e.g., Pavithra Mohan, For Many Women, Abortion Access Was Already Limited.
Then COVID-19 Hit, FAST CO. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90496986/formany-women-abortion-access-was-already-limited-then-covid-19-hit
[https://perma.cc/9B7ELX2L] (telling the story of a Houston woman who had to travel 1,500 miles to get an abortion
despite living three miles from a clinic).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

18

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 24:1

terminate her pregnancy.92 Assuming this was merely a temporary ban
and not an outright ban as the Fifth Circuit declared, what relief will the
women forced into full-term pregnancies be entitled to?93
Executive Order GA-09, though potentially well-intentioned to serve
the state’s interest of preserving PPE, does not bear a substantial
relation94 to combatting the COVID-19 pandemic; it is a plain and
palpable invasion of a constitutional right under Casey’s undue burden
standard.95 Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or
effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
impose an undue burden, which amounts to an unconstitutional burden.96
III. CASEY AND THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
In Casey, the Court clarified that not every law which makes a right
more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right.97
92. See Robinson v. Marshall, 450 F.Supp.3d 1293, 1297 (M.D. Ala.), stay granted, order
amended, No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2020 WL 1659700 (M.D. Ala. 2020) (finding plaintiffs had
established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that an executive order violated a
woman’s constitutional right to an abortion).
93. See e.g., Aleem Maqbool, Coronavirus: Texas Banned Abortion—How Did that Affect
Women?, BBC NEWS (May 6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52535940
[https://perma.cc/AD63-6H62] (illustrating the lengths a woman in Austin had to go through to
obtain an abortion of a fetus that had already passed away and another that was destined to die at
birth); see also Kevin Clark, Texas Clinics: Abortions Later in Pregnancy Increased After
Temporary Ban, KXAN (Aug. 12, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.kxan.com/investigations/
texas-clinics-abortions-later-in-pregnancy-increased-after-temporary-ban/
[https://perma.cc/84
3W-PALN] (reporting that many women who did not have the financial means to travel to another
state were forced to seek second-trimester abortions); see also Galina Espinoza, ‘Total Panic’:
How One Texas Woman Sought an Abortion After Her State Banned Them, REWIRE NEWS GRP.
(Apr. 6, 2020, 1:55 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2020/04/06/total-panic-how-one-texas-woman
-sought-an-abortion-after-her-state-banned-them/ [https://perma.cc/TP9V-PS5H] (portraying a
woman’s five-day journey to procure an abortion).
94. See Michelle J. Bayefsky et al., Abortion During the Covid-19 Pandemic—
Ensuring Access to an Essential Health Service, NEW ENG. J. MED. (May 7, 2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2008006 [https://perma.cc/Z6H8-Z2YS] (rebutting
the argument that the restriction of abortion will allow increase in availability of PPE by showing
restriction to abortion leads to greater need for PPE).
95. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
877–78 (1992) (holding a statute that furthers a valid state interest but nonetheless places a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of
serving its legitimate ends).
96. Id. at 877–78 (“[A]n undue burden is an unconstitutional burden.”).
97. See id. at 873–74 (recognizing states have substantial flexibility in regulating liberties
and concluding that not all such regulations are necessarily infringements of those rights).
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Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether
for abortion or any other medical procedures.98
The Fifth Circuit conflates Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt with
Casey when it states GA-09 would constitute an undue burden if it were
proven “‘beyond question,’ [that] GA-09’s burdens outweigh its
benefits[.]”99 The concept of an undue burden has been utilized by the
Court in ways that could be considered inconsistent.100 But in setting
forth the undue burden standard, the Court in Casey clarified that:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus . . . And a statute
which, while furthering some valid state interest, has the effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered
a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.101

Though the undue burden analysis set out in Casey takes the benefits
and burdens into consideration, these benefits “were not placed on a scale
opposite [to] the law’s burdens.”102 “Rather, Casey discussed benefits
in considering the threshold requirement the state has a ‘legitimate
purpose’ and that the law is ‘reasonably related to that goal.’”103
The issue then is whether GA-09 places a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman’s choice.104 GA-09 does more than make it difficult
98. Id. at 874 (stating an incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate a law).
99. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 788–91 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016)) (“Under Casey, courts must ask whether an abortion
restriction is ‘undue,’ which requires consider[ing] the burdens a law imposes on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer.”); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Restoring Casey’s
Undue Burden Standard After Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701,
709 (2017) (addressing Justice Thomas’s dissent which argued the majority had “radically
rewrit[ten]” the undue-burden test by requiring courts to compare the burdens and benefits of a
challenged regulation).
100. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (citing several Supreme Court opinions which have created
inconsistent applications of the undue burden standard).
101. Id. at 877.
102. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2138 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (analyzing how the Court in Casey focused on the “substantial obstacle” standard).
103. Id.
104. Compare GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (establishing a woman cannot receive
an abortion during the COVID-19 pandemic because it is considered a surgery or procedure
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for a woman to procure an abortion; it expressly forbids her from doing
so until the state decides otherwise.105 Therefore, the decision to get an
abortion before viability is no longer within a woman’s control but within
the control of the state.106 The Court in Casey emphasized a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the rule of law and a
component of liberty that could not be renounced.107 The majority
suggested that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to
the state’s intervention.108 But the suggestion set out in Casey is far
more lenient than the real-world application of GA-09.109 Governor
Abbott’s order does not afford a woman the opportunity to fail to act.110
Instead, the order prevents a woman from acting altogether and assaults
her constitutional right without her consent.111 This order causes women
to lose their bodily autonomy and forces them to continue their
pregnancies.112
Similarly, in Casey, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s twenty-four-hour
mandatory waiting period which the state argued furthered their
“not immediately necessary to correct a serious medical condition. . .”), with Casey, 505 U.S.
at 877 (holding a woman has a right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability and to
obtain it without undue interference from the state).
105. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (requiring women to abstain from elective
abortions to prevent the depletion of hospital capacity and PPE); see also Medically Unnecessary
Surgeries, supra note 14 (warning no one is exempt from Governor Abbott’s executive order
banning elective procedures, including abortion providers).
106. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (prohibiting all abortions which are not
immediately medically necessary); see also Medically Unnecessary Surgeries, supra note 14
(reiterating the ban on elective procedures issued in Abbott’s executive order and underlining that
women will be forced to carry a pregnancy to term during the pandemic if that pregnancy does not
pose a health emergency).
107. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (stressing a woman’s right to pre-viability termination is
the central principal of Roe v. Wade and a component of liberty which cannot be renounced).
108. See id. at 870 (implying that the viability line has an element of fairness because it
enables a woman to act before the state can intervene).
109. Compare id. at 871 (giving a woman the ultimate authority before viability to terminate
her pregnancy), with GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (prohibiting a woman from exercising
her right to an abortion during the height of COVID-19).
110. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (ordering postponement of all unnecessary
surgeries and procedures during a public health disaster).
111. See id. (threatening those who fail to comply with the order with punishment by fine
and/or jail time).
112. See generally id. (banning all elective procedures, including abortions, not
immediately medically necessary); contra Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“The State does not compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this
duty as a matter of course.”).
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legitimate interest in maternal health and in unborn life.113 The
mandatory period was said to delay, but not prohibit, abortions and was
therefore found not to impose a health risk or a substantial obstacle.114
But a twenty-four-hour waiting period varies drastically from a thirty-day
waiting period.115 Compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes
upon a woman’s right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical
intrusions and significant risks of physical harm.116 The Court has ruled
that a state must avoid subjecting women to health risks not only where
the pregnancy itself creates danger, but also where state regulation forces
women to resort to less safe methods of abortion.117 If forced to wait
until GA-09’s expiration date, a woman at nine weeks LMP would be
forced to procure a procedural abortion instead of a medication one.118
A woman who had every intention to seek a procedural abortion at sixteen
weeks LMP would be forced to travel to another state before she reaches
twenty weeks and is therefore no longer eligible to obtain an abortion in
Texas.119 Likewise, if a woman were unable to procure an abortion due
to GA-09, or any other order, she would require ongoing in-person

113. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (“The idea that important decisions will be more informed
and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable,
particularly where the statute directs that important information become part of the background of
the decision.”).
114. See id. at 969 (claiming the 24-hour waiting period ensured a woman’s decision to
abort was a well-considered one).
115. Compare id. at 885 (justifying the 24-hour waiting period as a reasonable measure that
does not impede too greatly on a woman’s choice), with GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272
(enforcing an indefinite executive order that could be extended).
116. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasizing how state
restrictions on abortion violate a woman’s right to privacy).
117. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78–79 (1976)
(holding a ban on abortion which would force women to terminate their pregnancies through a more
dangerous method unconstitutional).
118. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.063(a)(2) (showcasing how the executive
order changes the time frame for when a woman can no longer receive a medical abortion); see also
Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-and-providers/mifeprex-mifepristone-information
[https://perma.cc/2TUC-AZ5K] (last updated Apr. 13. 2021) (advising people not to use abortion
pills after seventy days has elapsed since the first day of their last menstrual period).
119. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.004 (“An abortion of a fetus age 16 weeks
or more may be performed only at an ambulatory surgical center or hospital licensed to perform
the abortion.”).
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healthcare, lab tests, ultrasounds, and ultimately more PPE at each stage
of the pregnancy.120
Court rulings concerning abortion have demonstrated that an undue
burden exists in situations involving absolute obstacles and severe
limitations on individuals’ abortion decisions.121 “In Roe, the Court
invalidated a Texas statute that criminalized all abortions except those
necessary to save the life of the mother.”122 GA-09 imposes penalties
for all abortions performed except those necessary to save the life of the
mother.123 What is GA-09, if not the Texas statute in Roe, by a different
name?124 GA-09 constitutes an undue burden.125
IV. STARE DECISIS: A TALE OF TWO DOCTRINES
Before constructing its undue burden framework in Casey, the Court
goes into a lengthy discussion regarding its obligation to follow the
precedent set out in Roe.126 It notes that stare decisis is not an
“inexorable command,” but rather an examination informed by a series
of pragmatic considerations that include: whether related principles of
law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine, or whether facts have so changed, or
120. See Bayefsky et al., supra note 94 (“Women who are unable to obtain abortions will
either remain pregnant and require prenatal care and support during delivery or may use dangerous
methods to induce an abortion on their own . . . Both these scenarios could lead to much more
contact with clinicians and greater need for PPE, thereby increasing risks to both patients and
staff.”).
121. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 463 U.S. 416, 464 (1983), overruled
by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (suggesting the Court upholds restrictions on abortion unless unduly burdensome).
122. Id.
123. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (imposing obstacles on a woman’s
constitutional right to obtain an abortion during a pandemic).
124. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113–14 (1973) (describing the Texas statute at
issue, namely, that it bans abortions and attempted abortions except for the purpose of saving the
life of the pregnant person), with GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (mandating all health care
facilities cease all medically unnecessary surgeries, including abortions).
125. See Young, supra note 75 (“Texas’s decision bans nearly all abortions . . . ”);
see generally GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (banning abortions deemed not medically
necessary); cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992) (“A finding of an undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
. . . ”).
126. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (recognizing that no judicial system could do society’s
work if it viewed each issue afresh).
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come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.127
[A] court can either “retain or overrule” its precedents. If the former path
is chosen, a court can operate within existing precedent in four distinct
ways—by following, distinguishing, extending, or narrowing it. A court
that follows precedent applies the principle of an earlier case when it is
best understood to apply. A court that distinguishes precedent declines
to apply the principle of an earlier case when that principle is best
understood not to apply; that is, the court offers a persuasive explanation
as to why the principle does not govern the present circumstances. A court
that extends precedent applies the principle of an earlier case even when it
is best understood not to reach the present fact pattern. And a court
that narrows precedent declines to apply the principle of an earlier case
even when it is properly regarded as controlling. Extending and narrowing
are the inverse of one another; each subtly reformulates the original
principle, either broadening or diminishing its scope, such that the
modified principle either governs or fails to govern the present
circumstances.128

Both Jacobson and Casey remain valid precedents and raise the issue
of whether individuals possess a constitutional right to non-interference
from the state.129 So, how do we determine which of the two precedents
to apply?130 Are the frameworks set out within Jacobson and Casey in
conflict with one another?131 On one end lies the bodily autonomy cases
that hold no right is more sacred or is more carefully guarded than the
127. See id. at 854–55 (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”).
128. Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865,
885 (2019).
129. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (discussing the validity of a state’s interest regarding
interference with abortion access), with Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905)
(questioning a state’s ability to compel vaccination in the interest of the public health).
130. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (drawing the line for state interference concerning abortion
at fetal viability); see also Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38 (holding that mandatory vaccinations were a
legitimate exercise of the state’s powers to protect the health and safety of the people).
131. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 860–61 (reinforcing the Court’s previous decision in Roe
v. Wade), with Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25 (“According to settled principles the police power of a
State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).
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right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.132 On the other end are public health
cases established by Jacobson during the nineteenth century Lochner
era.133 The former is subject to the undue burden analysis, while the
latter is subject to the more lenient rational basis test.134 Jacobson
emphasized the police power and duty of states to protect citizens from
threats to their health, taking primarily a “population” view.135 During
the era Jacobson was decided:
[J]udges believed that the legislative authority to promote the health,
safety, and morality of the community—the ‘police power’—was not
limited by theories and doctrines that attempted to identify a discrete set of
inviolable ‘fundamental rights’ or ‘preferred freedoms.’ Instead, the police
power was limited by assuming that a person’s presumptive rights to livery
and property were nevertheless subordinate to the laws of the land that
actually advances the general welfare of the community as a whole . . .136

But just how far-reaching are the state’s police powers, and
furthermore, when must state powers yield to the Constitution?137 Texas
courts have recognized that police powers are both broad and
132. See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions:
A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 278 (2007) (opining there are two distinct lines of
constitutional doctrine touching on the right to make medical treatment decisions).
133. See id. at 295 (emphasizing that the public health cases view sick individuals not as
autonomous decision makers, but rather as public health problems and threats that must be
controlled).
134. See id. at 294–95 (“The first is the ‘public-health’ line of cases, beginning with
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which dealt with the constitutionality of mandatory-vaccination laws.
These cases emphasize the police power of the state over individual rights. The second is the newer
‘autonomy’ lines of case, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, which emphasizes individual
dignity and autonomy interests.”).
135. See id. 295 (explaining how cases such as Jacobson set the stage for right to access
and freedom of choice in medical decisions).
136. Symposium, What Is, and Isn’t, Currently Disputed About Lochner-Era Police-Powers
Jurisprudence, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2019) (expounding on the dynamic between
an individual’s fundamental rights and how the subordination of those rights by the police power
in the nineteenth century).
137. See generally Randy E. Barnett & Heather Gerken, Article I, Sec. 8: Federalism and
the Overall Scope of Federal Power, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive
-constitution/interpretation/article-i/section/8712 [https://perma.cc/HP7H-XZKP] (outlining the
Fourteenth Amendment and the interaction of federal constraints it places on things such as the
state’s police power).
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comprehensive.138 Although broad, the power is not without its
limits.139 Public necessity alone can justify the exercise of a state’s
police powers.140 Such exercises of a state’s police power “hinges upon
the public need for safety, health, security, and protection of the general
welfare of the community.”141 However, if a statute claims it was
enacted for these purposes yet bears no substantial relation to them, the
statute must yield to the Constitution.142 It does not follow that every
statute enacted for the promotion of these ends should be accepted as a
legitimate exertion of the state’s police powers.143
In Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court relied on Jacobson to justify
sterilization of those deemed feeble-minded.144 There, the Court stated
that, “[t]he principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”145 Fifteen years later,
in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court emphasized that marriage
and procreation are vital to the preservation of humans.146 The Court
mentioned these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police powers
of a state, but rather to emphasize their view that it was essential that
strict scrutiny be the framework used when reviewing a sterilization
law.147 In Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., the Texas Court of
138. See Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1011 (Tex. 1934) (recognizing
the police power but forbidding its exercise when the result is the destruction of rights, guaranties,
privileges, and restraints).
139. E.g., Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 268 S.W.3d 190, 215 (Tex. App.—Austin
2008, no pet.) (emphasizing the police power may not render the Constitution meaningless in that
it may not disregard fundamental rights).
140. See Tex. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Gibson’s Disc. Ctr. 541 S.W.2d 884, 887
(Tex. App.—Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (acknowledging that the police power is grounded upon
public necessity).
141. Id. (citing City of Coleman v. Rhone, 222 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1949,
writ ref’d)).
142. See id. (explaining statutes that inhibit fundamental rights under the guise of the police
power are invalid).
143. See generally id. (revealing some laws enacted under a state’s police power as
illegitimate exertions of said power).
144. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”).
145. Id. (holding the public welfare justifies compulsory sterilization).
146. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(acknowledging the importance of procreation in the survival of the human race).
147. See id. (emphasis added) (“We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that
strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
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Appeals stated, “[t]he legislature, in exercising its police power, ‘cannot,
by its mere fiat,’ make reasonable that which is indisputably
unreasonable, or unconstitutional.”148 The court in Satterfield also
noted:
For a statute or regulation to be a proper exercise of police powers, it must
(i) be appropriate and reasonably necessary to accomplish a purpose within
the scope of police power and (ii) be reasonable and not arbitrary or unjust
in the manner it seeks to accomplish the goal or statute or so unduly harsh
that it is out of proportion to the end sought to be accomplished.149

A. Is GA-09 an Arbitrary, Unjust, or Unduly Harsh Exercise of the
State’s Police Powers?
GA-09 caused women with unwanted pregnancies to travel to other
states to obtain abortion care.150 Abortion providers declared they had
turned away hundreds of patients seeking abortion care.151 Since
issuance of GA-09, Colorado abortion providers saw an increase in
patients from states like Texas.152 A thirty-four-year-old woman who
lived near Austin, Texas was told that one of the twins she was carrying
had died and the other twin was given a diagnosis of lethal skeletal
dysplasia, a condition incompatible with life.153 Devastated, she
attempted to obtain an abortion in Texas, but her doctor informed her that
the state banned the procedure and she would have to seek the abortion

unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals
in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.”).
148. Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 268 S.W.3d 190, 215 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008,
no pet.).
149. Id.
150. See Glenza, supra note 15 (sharing stories of women who boarded planes or drove out
of state seeking abortions); see also Maqbool, supra note 93 (describing the lengths some women
have gone through to receive reproductive health care in New Mexico).
151. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
at 10, In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), (No. A-20-CV-323-LY), 2020 WL 1815587
(order granting temporary restraining order) (spotlighting the tremendous need for abortion care).
152. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 72 (stressing that Texas’ restrictions on abortions due to
COVID-19 forced women to seek solutions elsewhere).
153. See Maqbool, supra note 93 (discussing one woman’s shock about her inability to
procure an abortion considering her circumstances. “We were told that condition was incompatible
with life and that the baby would suffocate upon being born and never be able to draw their first
breath.”).
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elsewhere.154 The woman and her husband ultimately traveled thirteen
hours to New Mexico, the closest state without a ban in place, to procure
the procedure she was unable to obtain in Texas.155 Another woman
from Waco, Texas had an appointment that was set to take place two days
after GA-09 went into effect.156 After her appointment was canceled due
to the restrictions, the woman looked to neighboring states, including
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Louisiana, which all had long wait
times or restrictions of their own.157
In In re Abbott, the district court’s temporary restraining order stated,
“[p]atients delayed past [ten] weeks LMP are no longer eligible for a
medication abortion.”158 The order further stated, “[p]atients delayed
past [fourteen] to [sixteen] weeks LMP are no longer eligible for an
aspiration abortion and must instead have a [dilation and evacuation
procedure (D&E)], which is lengthier and more complex.”159 Patients
delayed past sixteen weeks are no longer eligible for an abortion at a
clinic and must obtain care from a surgical center.160 Patients delayed
past twenty weeks LMP are no longer eligible to obtain an abortion in
Texas at all, absent exceptional circumstances.161 Women delayed past
the legal limit for abortion will have to carry the baby to term which will
require extensive use of PPE.162
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm

154. See id. (detailing the tragedies one family faced during pregnancy and their frustration
with restrictions on abortions in Texas during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic).
155. See id. (illustrating the difficulty placed upon families already struggling through
difficult situations to secure abortion care).
156. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 72 (expressing women’s frustrations with regulations
regarding abortions during the pandemic).
157. See id. (stressing the overload other states experienced due to orders like GA-09).
158. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 11,
In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), (No. A-20-CV-323-LY), 2020 WL 1815587.
159. Id.
160. See Texas Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.004 (indicating the point during a
pregnancy when abortions may only be performed at an ambulatory surgical center or hospital
licensed to perform the procedure).
161. See Texas Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.046 (listing exceptions to the general rules
prohibiting abortion after 20 weeks).
162. Cf. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
at 11, In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), (No. A-20-CV-323-LY), 2020 WL 1815587
(emphasizing these regulations would overall hinder hospital resources and not conserve PPE).
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medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for
all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem
of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically, and
otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily
will consider in consultation.163

GA-09 had the potential to compel a woman into an extended
pregnancy and place her in harm’s way.164 The power to compel
pregnancy, like the power to sterilize, may have far-reaching and
devastating effects.165 There is no redemption for whom the law
touches, only deprivation of a basic liberty.166
By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts
women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide
years of maternal care. The State does not compensate women for their
services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter of
course.167

During the time GA-09 was in effect, abortions declined in Texas.168
According to a study, after the order expired, abortions at twelve weeks
163. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
164. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927
(1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(“During pregnancy, women experience dramatic physical changes and a wide range of health
consequences. Labor and delivery pose additional health risks and physical demands. In short,
restrictive abortion laws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those
this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts.”).
165. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (comparing
forced sterilization to compulsory pregnancy).
166. See id. (suggesting the state’s experiment will conclusively deprive the individual of
their liberty).
167. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
168. See, e.g., Kari White et al., Changes in Abortion Following an Executive Order Ban
During the Coronavirus Pandemic, JAMA, Feb. 16, 2021, at 691 (noting stay-at home orders,
facilities’ coronavirus precautions, and patients’ reluctance to seek in person care may also have
contributed to the decline).
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or more increased.169 This increase was likely due to facilities’ limited
capacity to meet back-logged patient needs.170
B. Is GA-09 Appropriate and Reasonably Necessary to Accomplish a
Purpose Within the Scope of the State’s Police Power?
In describing a state’s police power to combat an epidemic, the Court
in Jacobson explained that the rights of an individual in respect to his or
her liberty, may at times under the pressure of great dangers, be subject
to restraint enforced by reasonable regulations.171 The Court has
acknowledged a state may interfere wherever public interests demand
it.172 The Fifth Circuit clarified that rights secured by the Constitution
do not disappear during a public health crisis but can be reasonably
restricted.173 The Fifth Circuit maintained that GA-09 was both
appropriate and reasonably necessary to accomplish its purported
purpose of preventing the spread of COVID-19.174 The purpose of GA09, according to the state, was furthered by “restricting” abortions
because abortions: (1) reduce the scarce supply of PPE available to
healthcare providers, (2) result in the hospitalization of women, thereby
reducing hospital capacity, and (3) contribute to the spread of the
virus.175
The Court in Jacobson, did not provide a different deferential
framework for the intrusion on fundamental rights, but rather remained
169. See, e.g., id. at 691 (“Texas residents receiving care at out-of-state facilities increased
from 157 in February 2020 to 947 in April 2020.”).
170. See id. at 692 (outlining the rise in abortion cases following the removal of the order
and the suspected reasons for the increase).
171. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (posing the following
hypothetical: “an American citizen arriving at a port on a vessel in which during the voyage, there
had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, he, although apparently free from disease himself,
may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or
in a quarantine station, until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the
danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared.”).
172. See id. (clarifying that although the Fourteenth Amendment secures certain liberties,
one may be compelled, “by force if need be,” against his will and without regard to his personal
wishes or even religious or political convictions for the purpose of protecting the collective public).
173. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 2020) (justifying “reasonable” restrictions
on rights secured by the Constitution and describing the scope of judicial authority to review under
certain circumstances).
174. See id. at 787 (stating that GA-09 would be constitutionally intolerable in ordinary
times but is a proper response to emergencies like the COVID-19 crisis).
175. Id. at 802 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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committed to the normal scrutiny required by the Constitution.176
Preventing a woman from procuring an abortion during a pandemic is not
a valid exercise of police power under Jacobson.177 Although Jacobson
emphasizes deference to legislatures,178 the mere assertion by the
legislature that a statute relates to the public health, safety, or welfare
does not in and of itself bring such statute within the police powers of a
state.179 Police powers must not invade or intrude upon the
constitutional rights of citizens.180 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit turned
to cases that were upheld against Fourteenth Amendment challenges and
referred to or relied on Jacobson, in order to justify GA-09’s
regulations.181 However, GA-09 is unlike any of those exercises of
police power for one distinct reason; the implication of this regulation is
compulsory pregnancy.182 A woman’s right to an abortion was not

176. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39, 41
(2020) (examining the powers possessed by government during times of emergency and
determining whether Supreme Court jurisprudence in Jacobson mandates a more deferential
standard for government action during those times); see generally Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 20
(“If they act in an arbitrary manner, depriving any individual of a right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, their action in such individual case is void.”).
177. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020), 141 S.Ct. 63,
70 (2020) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (opining that Jacobson did not seek to depart from normal rules
during a pandemic and reiterating the scrutiny test set forth by the Court for all future cases).
178. See Hill, supra note 132, at 282 (suggesting the question of deference boils down to
the question of who decides whether a medical treatment has therapeutic merit and arguing that
legislatures are particularly ill suited to this task).
179. See Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 268 S.W.3d 190, 215 (Tex. App.–Austin
2008, no pet.) (detailing the circumstances in which a statute would fall under police powers of
state. Emergency circumstances may allow for the exercise of police powers, but those powers
cannot exceed rights secured by the Constitution).
180. See Laura D. Heard, Education-House Bill 72-Teacher Competency Testing Is Valid
Exercise of State Legislative Police Power. Texas State Teacher’s Ass’n v. State, 711 S.W. 2d 421
(Tex. App.–Austin 1986, No Writ), 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 661, 662 (1986) (indicating there is no
exception for the state to interfere with constitutional rights under the Texas Constitution or the
U.S. Constitution).
181. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Compagnie Francaise de
Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902) as an example of how
the Fourteenth Amendment may falter during a pandemic).
182. See, e.g., Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 63, at 2 (indicating a plaintiff
would suffer imminent irreparable harm if the court did not grant relief because she would be
delayed or prevented from exercising her right.) (“A disruption or denial of these patients’ health
care cannot be undone.”).
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afforded to her until 1973.183 Constitutional jurisprudence revolving
around bodily autonomy, procreation, and due process has evolved
immensely since Jacobson was decided in 1905.184 GA-09 prevents a
woman from abortion access in Texas185 and attempts to disguise itself
as a valid exercise of police power by focusing on the exception set out
by its construction.186 This order forces a woman into a position where
her only options are to: (1) travel out of state to get an abortion, (2) carry
the baby to term, or (3) find the means to procure an abortion in an illegal
and unsafe manner.187 GA-09 is nothing more than a ruse intended to
convince us that the state can impinge on a woman’s constitutional
right.188 “This effective denial of the Fourteenth Amendment right to
abortion access represents the type of ‘plain, palpable invasion of rights’
identified in Jacobson as beyond the reach of even the considerable
powers allotted to a state in a public health emergency.”189 The order is
neither appropriate nor reasonable to accomplish the purpose within the
scope of the police powers.190 Jacobson does not grant a plenary

183. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding women have a constitutional right to
abortion), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
184. See generally Hill, supra note 132, at 306–10 (exploring the line of bodily autonomy
cases beginning with Griswold to show the advancement of jurisprudence in these areas).
185. See generally Medically Unnecessary Surgeries, supra note 14 (proclaiming GA-09
requires all medically unnecessary procedures, including abortions of any kind, immediately
cease).
186. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“It will always be presumed
that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this
character.”); see also In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 788 (5th Cir. 2020) (“GA-09 includes an
emergency exception for the mother’s life and health based on the determination of the
administering physician.”).
187. Chantal Da Silva, Pregnant Women in Texas Considering Home Abortions, Traveling
Out of State After Coronavirus Ban, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 3, 2020, 11:35 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/pregnant-women-texas-considering-home-abortions-traveling-outstate-after-coronavirus-ban-1495989 [https://perma.cc/2QUF-R9YM] (reporting the harrowing
requests one doctor received for at-home and alternative abortion remedies); see also Bayefsky et
al., supra note 94 (implying women could resort to dangerous methods to induce abortions on their
own).
188. Cf. Robinson v. Marshall, 450 F.Supp.3d 1293, 1297 (M.D. Ala.), stay granted, order
amended, No. 2:19CV365-MHT, 2020 WL 1659700 (M.D. Ala. 2020) (“[I]n evaluating a ban on
pre-viability abortion, no state interest can prevail: ‘Before viability, the State’s interests are not
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion . . . ‘.”).
189. Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 63, at 5.
190. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (establishing the police power
and its limit in relation to rights and privileges protected by the Constitution of the United States).
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override of rights protected by the Constitution even though there is a
valid state interest in public health and safety.191
Even if this order was within the state’s police powers, GA-09
accomplishes the opposite of its purported interests.192 Individuals with
ongoing pregnancies require more in-person healthcare at each stage of
pregnancy than individuals who have pre-viability abortions.193
Therefore, delaying access to abortion will not conserve PPE.194
Individuals with ongoing pregnancies are also more likely to seek
treatment in a hospital for various conditions than individuals who have
pre-viability abortions.195 Although GA-09 was arguably wellintentioned to preserve PPE, hospital capacity, and reduce the spread of
COVID-19, the regulation was far from a reasonable restriction.196 Days
before GA-09 was set to expire, the Texas legislature passed another
executive order on April 17, 2020, which eased restrictions on surgical
procedures and allowed for operations to be performed in facilities that
certified in writing that they would reserve at least twenty-five percent of
their capacity for COVID-19 patients and would not request PPE from
any public source.197 Why was this order their last resort and not their
first?198
191. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S.Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J. concurring)
(questioning the attempt to use Jacobson to justify departing from the normal scrutiny required for
First Amendment rights).
192. Compare GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271 (listing PPE preservation as a reason to limit
abortion procedures and surgeries), with Young, supra note 75 (rejecting the notion that abortions
require extensive amounts of PPE).
193. See Young, supra note 75 (noting the amount of PPE needed throughout a person’s
pregnancy and delivery is much greater than the amount of PPE used by individuals who elect previability abortions).
194. See id. (providing reasons why delaying abortion will deplete, rather than conserve,
PPE in the long run).
195. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 9,
In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), (No. A-20-CV-323-LY), 2020 WL 1815587 (listing
reasons why a woman who has a full-term pregnancy might require more frequent doctor and
hospital visits than a woman who elects to terminate her pregnancy.).
196. See Jackson, supra note 176, at 46 (stating that although an act may be purported to be
for the greater good of public safety, if it is a palpable invasion of rights, it is unreasonable, and the
courts must step in to correct the error).
197. See GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272 (detailing new policies for surgical
procedures).
198. See Executive Orders by Governor Greg Abbott, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR.,
https://lrl.texas.gov/legeLeaders/governors/displayDocs.cfm?govdoctypeID=5&governorID=45
[https://perma.cc/P7ZN-JUCB] (notifying the general public of the changes and restrictions on non-
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Despite GA-09’s purported purpose of public safety, health, and the
conservation of hospital capacity and PPE, the order was inappropriate,
unnecessary, arbitrary, unjust, and so unduly harsh that it cannot be
viewed as a proper exercise of police powers.199
C. Classifying Jacobson: Rational Basis or Something More?
The Fifth Circuit articulated how the Jacobson framework would apply
to the Casey undue burden analysis and explained that this analysis would
consider whether GA-09 imposes burdens on abortion that, beyond
question, exceed its benefits in combating the epidemic Texas faced.200
The Fifth Circuit attempted to use three principal abortion cases’ (Roe,
Casey, and Carhart) mention of Jacobson to suggest no rights—
including fundamental rights—are completely free from state
intervention.201
[All] cite Jacobson with approval and without suggesting that abortion
rights are somehow exempt from its framework. In Roe, the Supreme Court
cited Jacobson as one example of the Court’s refusal to recognize an
‘unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases.’ The Court reasoned
that the right to abortion ‘is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.’ Similarly, in Casey, the plurality
cited Jacobson as one example of the Court’s balance between ‘personal
autonomy and bodily integrity’ on one hand and ‘governmental power to
mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection’ on the other. Finally, in
the course of upholding a federal restriction on certain abortion methods
in Carhart, the Court cited Jacobson to show it had ‘given state and federal
legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty.’202

essential surgical procedure including abortions); see also GA-09, supra note 10, at 2271, 2272
(removing some of the restrictions on non-essential surgical procedures by placing policies for
conservation of PPE into place).
199. Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28–29 (1905) (requiring emergency
measures enacted by the state during a public health crisis be reasonably related to the state’s
interest).
200. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussing the district court’s
failure to apply right analysis to GA-09 in light of the COVID-19 pandemic).
201. See id. at 785 (recognizing the abortion right in all three cases but noting that none of
the cases involved postponement of procedures in response to a public health crisis).
202. Id.
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The scrutiny applied to the vaccination law in Jacobson was arguably
stricter than its deferential language indicates and is often treated as
precedent that places limitations on state powers rather than a vindication
of unlimited state powers.203 The Court in Jacobson used arbitrariness
as a guidepost—a standard associated with rational basis scrutiny.204
The standard for abortion cases is not strict scrutiny, nor is it the
rational basis test.205 The constitutional test for abortion is the undue
burden standard.206 To read Jacobson as the Fifth Circuit did takes the
standard used in that case out of context and ignores decades of
constitutional jurisprudence relating to fundamental rights.207
Because COVID-19 tested boundaries of state interference into
constitutional liberties, it was clear that other liberties, aside from
abortion, would also be tested.208 In South Bay Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, the Governor of California issued an executive order which
attempted to limit the spread of COVID-19 by placing temporary
restrictions on public gatherings, including limiting attendance at places
of worship to twenty-five percent of building capacity or a maximum of

203. B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology of Restricting Abortion
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 106 (2020) (noting the central
question in Jacobson, “was decided long before the Court recognized an individual right to bodily
integrity and decisional autonomy.”).
204. See, e.g., id. at 107 (implying a lack of fundamental comprehension regarding the
application of Jacobson).
205. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 874–76 (1992) (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
206. See id. (identifying the undue burden standard as a new level of scrutiny, focusing on
a woman’s fundamental right instead of the government’s interest).
207. See Jackson, supra note 176, at 41 (“The bottom line is this: when faced with a societythreatening epidemic, a state may implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional rights
so long as the measures have at least some “real or substantial relation” to the public health crisis
and are not “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law.”).
208. See Food and Drug Admin. v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 592 U.S.
___ (2021), 141 S.Ct. 10 (2020) (concerning contraception availability and FDA regulations during
the COVID-19 pandemic); see also Republican Nat’l. Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l. Comm., 589
U.S.___ (2020), 140 S.Ct. 1205 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing the 2020 presidential
election and voting rights during the COVID-19 crisis); see also S. Bay Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), 140 S.Ct. 1613 (2020) (challenging religious freedom during the
COVID-19 pandemic as officials limited the number of individuals allowed into religious
establishments).
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one hundred attendees.209 There, the applicants sought to enjoin
enforcement of the Governor’s executive order.210 In denying the order,
Chief Justice Roberts cited Jacobson and stated the, “Constitution
principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the
politically accountable officials of the states to ‘guard and protect.’”211
But six months later, in Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, a
New York church and synagogue filed a civil action against Governor
Cuomo’s emergency executive order that similarly imposed occupancy
restrictions on houses of worship during the pandemic claiming the order
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.212 Although the
church and synagogue sought temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions, the district court denied both.213 On appeal, the
Supreme Court held: (1) both houses of worship were likely to succeed
on their merits, (2) both houses would be irreparably harmed in the
absence of injunctive relief, and (3) the public interest favored injunctive
relief.214 The Supreme Court granted the injunction in part because the
restrictions were not neutral and did not meet the strict scrutiny
requirements.215 In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch stated that
the opinion in South Bay was “mistaken from the start,” and that
Jacobson, “hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a
pandemic.”216 Justice Gorsuch further questioned why some have
mistaken the Court’s decision in Jacobson for a towering authority that
overshadows the Constitution during a pandemic and went on to state:

209. See S. Bay Pentecostal Church, 140 S.Ct. at 1613 (imposing blanket restrictions on all
places of gathering including, but not limited to, factories, offices, supermarkets, and restaurants).
210. See id. (clarifying that injunctions are solely used in the context of exigent
circumstances where the legal rights are “indisputably clear”).
211. Id. (providing state officials with broad deference not “subject to second-guessing”);
Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
212. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S.Ct. at 63 (referencing the state’s decision
to cap the number of people who could attend religious services based on the house of worships’
location within a designated zone).
213. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting religious services are not “essential
businesses”).
214. Cf. id. (proving the restrictions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment).
215. Cf. id. at 67 (noting that the challenged restrictions and categorizations treated stores
and other establishments less harshly than the Diocese’s churches and Agudath Israel’s
synagogues).
216. Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Although Jacobson pre-dated the modern tiers of scrutiny, this Court
essentially applied rational basis review to Henning Jacobson’s challenge
to a state law that, in light of an ongoing smallpox pandemic, required
individuals to take a vaccine, pay a $5 fine, or establish they qualified for
an exemption. Rational basis review is the test this Court normally applies
to Fourteenth Amendment challenges . . . Put differently, Jacobson didn’t
seek to depart from normal legal rules during a pandemic, and it supplies
no precedent for doing so. Instead, Jacobson applied what would become
the traditional legal test associated with the right at issue—exactly what
the court does today.217

Justice Gorsuch discerns Jacobson to convey that states do not
necessarily have more authority or deference during a pandemic when
determining to restrict certain rights, but rather Jacobson reinforces what
we already know.218 A state must meet the corresponding level of
judicial scrutiny depending on the constitutional freedom in question.219
Put simply, the judicial scrutiny that must be applied when a state
attempts to interfere with a constitutional liberty depends on the liberty
in question.220 Justice Gorsuch indicates even if judges may impose
emergency restrictions on rights found in the Constitution’s penumbras,
it does not follow that the same fate should befall the textually explicit
right to religious exercise because religious rights are subject to a
heightened level of scrutiny.221 Accordingly, abortion would not all of
a sudden be subject to the less stringent rational basis test.222 The Court
and its individual Justices have repeatedly utilized the “unduly
burdensome” standard in abortion cases.223
217. Id.
218. Cf. id. (“[J]acobson hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a
pandemic.”).
219. Accord id. (insisting strict scrutiny apply due to the infringement on a fundamental
right).
220. See id. (emphasizing how strict scrutiny must be narrowly tailored to satisfy a
compelling state interest when applied to religious liberty).
221. See id. at 70–71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (distinguishing the bodily integrity right in
Jacobson with the fundamental right to religious exercise).
222. Cf. id. at 70 (stating Jacobson does not stand for the proposition that the level of
scrutiny depends on whether there is a public health crisis, but instead depends on the constitutional
right in question).
223. E.g., Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983), overruled
by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent policy in this difficult area,

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol24/iss1/1

36

Gonzalez: Abortion During a Public Health Crisis

2022]

RIGHT TO ABORTION DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS

37

Therefore, the framework in Jacobson does not permit a state’s police
powers to impose blanket infringements on fundamental rights.224
Instead, it explicitly sets out an exception to prevent arbitrary abuse.225
Nonetheless, while it is true that no right is absolute, a statute or
regulation enacted which attempts to impede on a fundamental right must
be met with the highest level of judicial scrutiny.226 In order to satisfy
strict scrutiny requirements, a rule or regulation must be narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest.227 Even though the Court in Roe
recognized a woman’s right to an abortion as fundamental,228 Casey and
constitutional jurisprudence surrounding abortion rights have failed to
uphold this classification and have stopped applying strict scrutiny.229
Instead, the Court in Casey appeared to strip the designation of a right
to abortion as fundamental and instead devised the undue burden test to
determine whether a state infringes on a woman’s right.230 If our laws
recognize the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted
‘the Constitution does not constitute us as ‘Platonic Guardians’ nor does it vest in this Court the
authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy.
‘wisdom’ or ‘common sense.’’”).
224. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S.Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(questioning why some have mistaken the Court’s decision in Jacobson as towering authority that
overshadows the Constitution during a pandemic).
225. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (reiterating that police powers
could be used in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner that would authorize courts to interfere.
The Court recognizes there could be necessities of a case that require protecting citizens, but it
cannot go beyond what is reasonable.).
226. See generally Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (“‘Substantive due process’
analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for ‘the doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost ground in this field.’”).
227. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767 (1997) (“This approach calls
for a court to assess the relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the contending interests, and to this extent
the judicial method is familiar to the common law.”).
228. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (recognizing that regulations of
fundamental rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest. The Court proceeds to apply
this level of judicial scrutiny and concludes that the regulations in question swept too broadly and
that the compelling state interest began at the end of the first trimester, not before.), modified,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
229. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (noting the Court has since rejected
Roe’s holding that abortion regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest, and therefore rejected the notion that the right abortion is a fundamental right).
230. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
874–76 (1992) (urging courts to recognize not all regulations are unwarranted when a state has a
substantial interest; therefore, not all burdens are undue when deciding the right to terminating a
pregnancy).
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governmental intrusion into matters that fundamentally affect a person,
including the decision whether to bear or beget a child,231 why is a
woman’s constitutional right to an abortion deemed any different from
other fundamental rights protected under the rubric of personal privacy
and reproductive autonomy?232 Should this designation be reinstated so
that a state cannot easily reattempt to pass regulations under the guise of
public health?233 Why is this particular branch of reproductive
autonomy not afforded equal protection under the law?234
V. REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
If a right is deemed fundamental, the government only prevails if it
meets strict scrutiny.235 But when is a right deemed fundamental?236
According to the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
in Roe failed to establish the right to abortion was ‘deeply rooted’ in this
nation’s history and tradition, but instead simply based its conclusion on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty being broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision on whether or not to terminate

231. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (disregarding marital status as a
consideration when evaluating unwarranted governmental intrusion on privacy).
232. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (applying the undue burden analysis in matters
concerning whether to bear or beget a child), with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (emphasizing marriage and procreation as fundamental and assigning
strict scrutiny as the proper test for evaluating sterilization laws).
233. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 926–27 (prohibiting the government from intruding into
intimate matters including procreation) with Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (upholding a sterilization law
under the guise of public safety).
234. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (utilizing the undue burden standard), with Skinner,
316 U.S. at 542 (applying strict scrutiny), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(concluding legislation prohibiting contraception conflicted with fundamental human rights and
therefore warranted strict scrutiny).
235. E.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (reaffirming due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids the government from infringing on certain fundamental
liberty interests unless the government’s infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest).
236. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (recognizing the
established method of substantive due process analysis has two primary features. First, the Due
Process Clause protects fundamental rights which are objectively deeply rooted in this nation’s
history and tradition. Second, substantive due process cases must have a “careful description” of
asserted fundamental liberty interest.).
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her pregnancy.237 However, the Court in Roe discusses at length the
history of abortion in English common law and in America, and notes the
criminal abortion laws in effect at the time Roe was decided were of
“relatively recent vintage.”238
A. A History of Abortion
In America, the law in effect in all but a few states reflected the English
common law until the mid-nineteenth century.239 At common law,
abortions performed before ‘quickening’—the point at which a pregnant
woman could feel the movements of the fetus (approximately four
months)—were not a crime.240
The common law’s attitude toward pregnancy and abortion was based on
an understanding of pregnancy and human development as a process rather
than an absolute moment . . . Quickening was a moment recognized by
women and by law as a defining moment in human development. Once
quickening occurred, women recognized a moral obligation to carry the
fetus to term. This age-old idea underpinned the practice of abortion in
America . . . By the mid-eighteenth century, the most common means of
inducing abortion–—by taking drugs—was commercialized . . .
Furthermore, abortifacients were a profitable product sold by doctors,
apothecaries, and other healers. The first statutes governing abortion in the
United States . . . were poison control measures designed to protect
pregnant women . . . by controlling the sale of abortifacient drugs which
often killed women who took them.

By the 1840s, the market for abortions “boomed.”241 Abortifacients
were advertised and available for purchase, despite laws forbidding the

237. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595 (2003) (acknowledging that although the Court
in Roe found abortion was not “deeply rooted” in history, a woman’s right to abortion was
nonetheless protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
238. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129–47 (1973) (discussing at length the history and
development of abortion and regulations on abortion in the United States), modified, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
239. See id. at 138 (illustrating the approaches several states took regarding the
implementation of abortion laws and how those approaches compared to the English common law).
240. See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 8 (U.C. Press ed., 1998)
(tracing the criminalization of abortion to the eighteenth and early nineteenth century English
common law).
241. See id. (demonstrating the growth of the abortion business despite efforts to curtail it).
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sale.242 If abortifacients failed, women could obtain instrumental
abortions through practitioners and midwives who specialized in the
procedure.243
In 1857, the American Medical Association led a crusade to make
abortion illegal at every stage.244 The campaign was due in large part to
physicians’ desires to control medical practice and restrict their
competitors.245 Dr. Horatio R. Storer, the leader of the medical
campaign against abortion, aimed to sway public opinion against
abortion, pushed for increased legal restrictions, and argued that life must
begin at conception rather than at quickening.246 According to the Court
in Roe, “it is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption
of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the nineteenth
century . . . a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a
pregnancy than she does in most states today.”247 The option to choose
whether to have an abortion was present well into the nineteenth
century.248 Accordingly, the history and origin of abortion was not

242. See id. (proving laws passed to prevent the sale of these medicines did not stop them
from being sold).
243. E.g., id. (listing abortion alternatives available to women if abortifacient drugs did not
work).
244. See id. at 10–11 (explaining the antiabortion campaign was created partially as an
attempt to make up for the decline in birth rates among the Yankee class. Dr. Horatio R. Storer,
the leader of the antiabortion campaign, envisioned the spread of civilization west and south by
native born white Americans and suggested that those regions should be filled by their “own”
children not those of aliens. Reagan asserts therefore, white male patriotism demanded maternity
be enforced among white Protestant women.).
245. See id. at 10 (indicating regular physicians had come under attack as elitist and faced
competition from a variety of practitioners including midwives and homeopaths).
246. See Richa Venkatraman, Horatio Robinson Storer (1830-1922), THE EMBRYO
PROJECT ENCYC. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/horatio-robinson-storer-18301922 [https://perma.cc/JL2W-QPRQ] (“[Storer] argued that the fetus could not be considered dead
before quickening and therefore must be considered alive, and that abortion was murder because it
involved willingly terminating a life in its early stages of existence.”).
247. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973) (“It is thus apparent that at common law,
at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the nineteenth
century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in
effect. Phrasing it a different way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a
pregnancy than she does in most states today.”), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
248. See id. at 140 (stating women had the choice to get an abortion without interference by
the state for the majority of the nineteenth century. Even after the nineteenth century, women still
faced less punitive consequences for obtaining an abortion.).
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always deemed immoral.249
B. Procreation, Contraception, & Abortion: One of These Things is
Not Like the Other. Or is It?
Procreation is defined as the decision to bear or beget a child and is
deemed fundamental to the very existence of the human race.250
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held matters concerning
contraception are subject to strict scrutiny because they involve the
decision whether to have a child.251 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court held government-imposed sterilization is subject to strict
scrutiny because it deprives an individual of the right to have a child.252
What is abortion but another personal decision regarding whether to have
a child?253 How do these three reproductive autonomy rights—
procreation, contraception, and abortion—differ, and how are they
alike?254
According to the Supreme Court, abortion is inherently different from
sterilization and contraception because abortion involves the purposeful
249. See Reagan, supra note 240, at 6 (dispelling the idea that hostility to abortion is almost
an absolute value in history. Reagan asserts that the illegality of abortion has hidden the existence
of an unarticulated, alternative, popular morality which supported women who had abortions
despite it being against the law.).
250. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (defining
procreation and claiming marriage and procreation are both fundamental to the existence and
survival of the human race).
251. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“Such a law cannot stand in
light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a ‘governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’”).
252. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (instituting a statute allowing government-imposed
sterilization will necessarily require review under strict scrutiny, otherwise, invidious
discriminations may be made against groups or individuals).
253. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169–70 (1973) (“[W]e recognized ‘the right to
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.’ That right
necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”),
modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 840 (discussing that ultimately a woman must make the decision as to whether
or not to have an abortion and finding there to be no undue burden where a state requires her to
make a fully informed decision).
254. See generally Susan Bernstein, What Are Reproductive Rights?, WEBMD (May 25,
2021), https://www.webmd.com/sex/what-are-reproductive-rights [https://perma.cc/SQM5-6JVG]
(detailing reproductive rights as including all decisions concerning whether or not to have children).
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termination of a potential life.255 But when we examine the root cause
of why these three rights are similar, we find they all concern the
fundamental decision on whether to bear a child.256 Executive Order
GA-09 effectively prevented a woman from procuring an abortion and,
in essence forced her to seek refuge in another state, obtain an abortion
later in pregnancy (after lifting the order), or compel her into a pregnancy
she did not want.257 If we compare the forced sterilization of a man to a
woman forced to carry a pregnancy to term, don’t we find both are
deprived of the fundamental right to decide whether to have a child?258
Yet, in this instance, only the man’s sterilization would be afforded
heightened scrutiny.259
That is not to say that women cannot be forcibly sterilized.260 But
there is a natural difference between men and women; only women have
the capacity to bear children.261 In Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas,
the Supreme Court of Texas held that the biological truism
that abortions can only be performed on women does not necessarily
mean that governmental action restricting abortion discriminates on the
basis of gender.262 Similarly, in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
255. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(noting the abortion decision must be recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the rights
protected in the earlier cases under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy); see also
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (“The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education . . . ).
256. See generally Bernstein, supra note 244 (highlighting reproductive rights to include
access to more than just abortion services and include the legal ability to make decisions on having
children).
257. See Medically Unnecessary Surgeries, supra note 14 (threatening all abortion
providers to postpone procedures not immediately medically necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother); see also Glenza, supra note 15 (describing the choices women are forced to make
when the ability to obtain an abortion is removed locally).
258. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding
procreation and the decision whether to bear a child to be a fundamental right); see generally Casey,
505 U.S. at 833 (stripping abortion of its designation as a fundamental right under Roe).
259. Compare Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (utilizing strict scrutiny to determine whether the
sterilization is constitutional), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (protecting a woman’s right to abortion
where a state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to decide).
260. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding society can prevent those who are
manifestly “unfit” from continuing their kind by sustaining compulsory sterilization).
261. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (emphasizing the fact that only
women are able to give birth).
262. See Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex. 2002) (failing to
acknowledge abortion regulations discriminate based on gender).
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Clinic, the Supreme Court held the goal of preventing abortion does not
qualify as an invidiously discriminatory animus directed at women in
general.263 They went on to state:
Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sexbased intent; there are common and respectable reasons for opposing
abortion other than a derogatory view of women as a class. This Court’s
prior decisions indicate that the disfavoring of abortion, although only
women engage in the activity, is not ipso facto invidious discrimination
against women as a class.264

According to the Court in Casey, the decision in Roe undervalued the
state’s interest in the potential life within the woman, and the very notion
that a state has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the
conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.265 The
Court went on to say, “[a] woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however,
that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the
unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State’s interest in life
has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the
pregnancy can be restricted.”266 If the reason for hostility towards
abortion is not due to a derogatory view of women, but instead due to
opposition of termination of potential life, then why are women seeking
IVF not given the same amount of resistance when excess embryos not
used in the process are destroyed?267

263. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 263 (1993)
(emphasizing that restrictions on abortion do not meet the elements of class based invidiously
discriminatory animus).
264. See id. at 263–64 (“The record indicates that petitioners’ demonstrations are not
directed specifically at women, but are intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice,
and reverse legislation.”).
265. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
875–76 (1992) (arguing the Court in Roe set out a contradiction by recognizing the state’s interest
yet forbidding any regulation designed to advance that interest before viability).
266. Id. at 869.
267. See Jennifer Wright, Why Anti-Choice People Are Okay with IVF, HARPER’S
BAZAAR (June 14, 2019), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a27888471/why-antichoice-people-against-abortion-are-okay-with-ivf/ [https://perma.cc/96JB-Z5XW] (emphasizing
that although destroying embryos is not substantially different than an abortion, the latter results in
immense rage in the pro-life community); see also Andrew Hough, 1.7 Million Human Embryos
Created for IVF Thrown Away, TEL. (Dec. 31, 2012, 6:15 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/health/news/9772233/1.7-million-human-embryos-created-for-IVF-thrown-away.html
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In Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee acknowledged,
“the United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
procreation in the context of in vitro fertilization.”268 In Davis, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the right of procreational autonomy
is composed of two equally significant rights—the right to procreate and
the right to avoid procreation.269 The court balanced the interest of the
woman’s desire and right to procreate against her divorced husband’s
right not to procreate and held the party wishing to avoid procreation
should prevail.270 Accordingly, the unused embryos were destroyed.271
Similarly, in J.B. v. M.B., a woman became pregnant through the IVF
process but later sought to destroy the excess embryos that were
cryogenically frozen after she and her husband divorced.272 The
husband asserted his right to procreation outweighed his former wife’s
right not to procreate because her right to bodily integrity was not
implicated, and his religious beliefs regarding the protection of potential
life superseded her limited interests.273 Nonetheless, the court asserted
the woman’s right not to procreate could be lost if the embryos were used
or donated.274 The court further explained compelling biological
parenthood would violate public policy.275

[https://perma.cc/UGN4-972C] (reporting that almost half of embryos used to help a woman
conceive through IVF were thrown away during or after the process).
268. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (recognizing the inherent
tension between the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation in the context of IVF).
269. See id. (acknowledging the two rights in procreational autonomy when a divorced
couple could not agree on the disposition of their unused cryopreserved embryos).
270. See id. at 604 (Tenn. 1992) (assuming the adverse party has a reasonable possibility of
achieving parenthood by means other than using the embryos in question, the party wishing to
avoid procreation should prevail).
271. See id. at 605 (Tenn. 1992) (instructing the Knoxville Fertility Clinic to proceed with
its normal procedure in dealing with unused embryos).
272. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 711 (N.J. 2001) (finding that the parties engaged in
IVF to create a child within the context of their marriage but did not have the same objectives after
divorce).
273. See id. at 712 (considering the two competing interests at stake with regards to the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos).
274. See id. at 719–20 (granting his former wife the right to prevent implantation of the
embryos, because the husband was already a father and was capable of fathering additional children
without the embryos).
275. Wright, supra note 267 (“[C]linics that provide IVF (in vitro fertilization) extract eggs,
fertilize them in a lab, and then implant them in a womb.”).
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Clinics that provide IVF extract eggs, fertilize them in a lab, and then
implant them in a womb.276 Most people generate more than one viable
embryo, and those excess embryos can be cryogenically frozen and stored
in case IVF implementation does not initially work.277 When it does
work, however, people can choose to donate their excess embryos for
scientific research, which often leads to their destruction.278 If the
interest that states repeatedly assert revolves around the theory of life at
conception, why is it that destroying embryos is acceptable when it comes
to IVF but otherwise wicked and immoral when it comes to abortion?279
When it comes to IVF, a person seeking to avoid procreation is given
higher deference than one wanting to procreate.280 In effect, one set of
rules applies to those attempting to avoid procreation through IVF than
those trying to avoid procreation through abortion.281 This disparity
reveals a great deal about whose bodies our laws restrict.282 Thus,
“unlike IVF patients, who are primarily wealthy and white, women who
have abortions are disproportionately poor and women of color.”283
Could it be that IVF patients make less attractive targets because they
do not challenge the expectation that women want to be mothers?284
276. See id. (listing the steps in vitro fertilization clinics take).
277. Id. (“Most people produce more than one viable embryo. Those excess embryos can
be saved in case IVF implementation doesn’t work the first time.”).
278. See id. (noting alternative ways to get rid of the excess embryos, such as donating them
for scientific research, keeping them for future use, or offering them to other couples).
279. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (“[T]he State has legitimate
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
fetus that may become a child.”), with Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (1992) (allowing
embryos that were produced during IVF to be discarded when a person did not want to procreate).
280. See generally J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (2001) (finding that compelling
parenthood was against public policy); see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (holding that the party
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail).
281. Compare Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604–05 (favoring a person who wants to avoid
procreation by ordering embryos be discarded), with Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145 (asserting that a
state has an interest at the outset of a pregnancy).
282. See Margo Kaplan, Fertility Clinics Destroy Embryos All the Time. Why Aren’t
Conservatives After Them?, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/fertility-clinics-destroy-embryos-all-the-time-why-arent-conservatives-after-them/2015/
08/13/be06e852-4128-11e5-8e7d-9c033e6745d8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/2VDY-J8PF]
(suggesting abortion restrictions are often less about protecting life and more about controlling
women’s bodies).
283. Id.
284. See id. (recounting one woman’s personal experience of donating her excess embryos
to research. The woman realized the huge disparity between how the law treats IVF patients and

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

45

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

46

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 24:1

Abortion, on the other hand, challenges conservative ideals regarding a
woman’s proper role as a wife and mother.285 “[T]his way of thinking
reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the
constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”286 If the state
truly had an interest in potential life, it would treat all embryos, IVF and
abortion, alike.287 Instead, it favors the destruction of embryos only
when a woman is likely to conceive a child.288 The state assumes women
should be forced to accept the “natural” status and incidents of
motherhood—an assumption that rests upon a women’s role that has
triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.289
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment instructs
that no state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.290 In applying the Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not deny states the power to behave differently toward

abortion patients and noted all she had to do was sign a form to donate her embryos, whereas
women seeking abortions often encounter state-directed counseling, mandatory waiting periods,
and medically inaccurate information.).
285. See id. (“Abortion, on the other hand, thwarts conservative ideals about a woman’s
proper role as a wife and mother.”).
286. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
destiny of the woman must be shaped . . . on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society[.]”).
287. See Emma Scornavacchi, The Glaring Exception in the Coming Battle Over
Reproductive Rights, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 8, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/150545/
glaring-exception-coming-battle-reproductive-rights [https://perma.cc/UT5Y-MLQ5] (showing
the embryos being discarded after IVF are the same type being extracted in abortion clinics).
288. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 338 F.Supp.3d 606, 641–42 (W.D. Tex. 2018)
(“[T]he State chose to draw a line between in vitro tissue cultures (pre-implantation embryos) and
post-implantation embryos and thus drew a line between the different types of facilities that handle
these embryos.”).
289. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(suggesting the state conscribes women’s bodies into their service by forcing women to continue
their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal
care).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol24/iss1/1

46

Gonzalez: Abortion During a Public Health Crisis

2022]

RIGHT TO ABORTION DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS

47

various classes of persons.291 The Equal Protection Clause does,
however, deny the state, “the power to legislate that different treatment
be accorded to persons, placed by statute into different classes, on the
basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.”292 As
such, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the Equal Protection Clause must
demonstrate that they have been treated differently from others who are
similarly situated.293
Is a woman’s decision not to bear a child by seeking an abortion treated
differently from a similarly situated person who chooses not to bear a
child through contraception or sterilization?294 The Supreme Court
devotes a great deal of attention insisting abortion is different from other
bodily autonomy cases and offers only one justification for why that
is.295 In Casey, the Court swiftly concludes abortion involves the
purposeful termination of potential life and therefore cannot fall under
the same rubric as other bodily autonomy cases.296 If abortion differs
from contraception and sterilization because it involves the termination
of potential life, then a fortiori, abortion and IVF are the same because
both involve the purposeful termination of embryos.297 Then, the
question is whether a woman deciding not to bear a child by seeking an
abortion is treated differently from a woman deciding not to bear all
excess embryos produced during in vitro fertilization.298

291. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
292. Id. at 75–76.
293. Id. at 77 (ruling the treatment regarding sex violated the Equal Protection Clause).
294. See id. at 75 (holding that an Idaho statute, which provided that as between persons
equally qualified to administer estates, males were preferred to females, was based solely on
discrimination prohibited by and violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Wienberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (invalidating a statute
that failed to grant a woman worker the same protection a “similarly situated” male worker would
have received).
295. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839
(1992) (clarifying the Court in Roe reached too far when it determined abortion was a fundamental,
all-encompassing right of privacy).
296. Id.
297. See Scornavacchi, supra note 287 (posing the puzzling challenge conservative groups
face when confronted with the following question: “How do organizations that liken embryos to
people reckon with a technology that creates babies for families but destroys embryos along the
way?”).
298. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 77 (“By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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A. Whether Women Who Seek to Procure Abortions Are a Subclass of
Women Discriminated Against
In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Supreme Court
reasoned abortion opposition cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a
sex-based intent, and the disfavoring of abortion is not ipso facto
invidious discrimination against women as a class.299 But the court’s
decision in Bray fails to question whether discrimination is aimed against
a subclass of women as opposed to women as a class.300 While abortions
are only performed on women, that does not preclude discrimination
against a subclass of women because subclasses of women have
experienced discrimination on numerous occasions.301
In Arnett v. Aspin, a woman brought a Title VII gender discrimination
claim alleging the defendant maintained a hiring policy of rejecting
women over the age of forty in favor of younger women.302 Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.303 The defendant asserted the plaintiff could not establish a prima
facie case of gender discrimination because the person ultimately selected
for the position was a woman.304 Rejecting this argument, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held the
plaintiff could bring a Title VII claim for “sex-plus” discrimination if she
establishes discrimination against a subclass of women based on either
299. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 263–64 (1993) (holding
there are “common and respectable” reasons for opposing abortion that do not reflect “animus”
against women based on their gender).
300. See id. at 264 (dismissing “women seeking abortion” as a qualifying class under 42
U.S.C. §1958(3) because the record shows the demonstrations in question are not directed at
women by reason of their sex).
301. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207, 213 (1982) (examining a state’s decision to
identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction. The Court held that
a state’s attempt to do so would undermine the principal purpose for which the Equal Protection
Clause was incorporated).
302. See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (referencing the
employer’s answer in the suit that all women hired were under the age forty, while all men hired
for the same position were over the age of forty).
303. See Eric Bachman, What Is “Sex-Plus” Discrimination and Why Are These
Employment Claims on the Rise?, FORBES (July 30, 2020, 11:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/ericbachman/2020/07/30/what-is-sex-plus-discrimination—and-why-are-these-employmentclaims-on-the-rise/?sh=716541e37357 [perma.cc/YYX8-GRMC] (defining the purpose of Title
VII and who it aims to protect).
304. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1237.
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an immutable characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right.305
Sex-plus discrimination claims expand Title VII to protect a subgroup of
employees suffering discrimination based on multiple characteristics.306
The rationale behind this “sex-plus” theory of gender discrimination is to
enable Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment where an
employer does not discriminate against all members of the same sex.307
In addition to recognizing subclasses could be subject to
discrimination, the Supreme Court has also recognized discrimination on
the basis of “gender stereotypes” as invalid.308 In Nev. Dep’t of Hum.
Res. v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court faced an Equal Protection challenge
and upheld legislation enacted to combat the stereotype that women’s
family duties trump those of the workplace.309 The Court noted the
state’s continued reliance on invalid gender stereotypes in the
employment context could not justify the state’s gender
discrimination.310
Women seeking in vitro fertilization destroy multiple excess
embryos.311 Yet, these women are not subjected to the same mandatory
counseling, waiting periods, visits, or pamphlets discussing the
305. See id. at 1239 (describing the requirements necessary for a plaintiff to bring a
successful Title VII claim for sex discrimination).
306. Bachman, supra note 303 (describing the effect sex-plus discrimination claims have
on the scope of Title VII’s protections and the new subclass of employees who are now protected).
307. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 (“The reasoning behind the holdings of Phillips and
its progeny is that when an employer discriminates against members of one sex, the victims of such
discrimination should have a remedy under Title VII which expressly prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex. The point behind the establishment of the sex-plus discrimination theory is to
allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment when the defendant employer does not
discriminate against all members of the sex.”).
308. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 754 (2003) (“The application of
heightened scrutiny is designed to ensure gender-based classifications are not based on the
entrenched and pervasive stereotypes which inhibit women’s progress in the workplace.”)
(reviewing a case concerning gender stereotypes and discrimination in the workplace).
309. See generally id. at 732 (observing the history of many state laws which limited
women’s employment opportunities due to beliefs that women should remain the center of home
and family life).
310. See id. at 730 (claiming the continued reliance by states on unconstitutional
discrimination based on gender stereotypes justifies legislation passed by Congress to end this type
of discrimination).
311. See Kaplan, supra note 282 (“Conservatives are clearly not concerned about the
process of tissue donation; they are targeting Planned Parenthood alone and ignoring the hundreds
of fertility clinics that legally destroy and donate embryos that women do not want or are unable to
carry to term.”).
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implications of their decision to destroy potential life that women who
procure abortions are.312 Could it be social conservatives have no
concern for the moral status of the human embryo but rather oppose
access to abortion because it threatens traditional and distinctive gender
roles?313
The continued hostility toward abortion, even to the earliest form of
possible abortion embodied in emergency contraception, coupled with the
absence of attacks on IVF, can best be described as a relative indifference
to the moral status of the embryo, but rather a great deal of hostility toward
economic equality of women, sexual activity outside of marriage, and
marriages that are not organized along traditional gender lines. When
conservative activists see abortion, they see the destruction of embryos,
yes, but they also see women who are insisting on their equality in the
workplace and on marriages that are not organized around strong gender
roles. When conservatives see IVF, they largely ignore the destruction of
embryos, because they see heterosexual married couples going to great
lengths to have children. Thus, it appears that the crucial variable in the
equation is not the destruction of the embryo, but the behavior and roles
and possibilities open to women. Anti-abortion activists claim to be
motivated purely by concern for the unborn, but in fact they are motivated
primarily by concerns for the shape of society and for the preservation of
traditional gender roles.314

The state’s insistence that it can insert itself at the outset of pregnancy
because it has a legitimate interest in the life of the embryo is hypocritical
at most and suspect at the very least.315 This disparity is further evidence
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith.316 There, Texas enacted Senate Bill
312. See id. (describing the various steps a women seeking an abortion must go through to
have an abortion).
313. See Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 275, 294 (2006)
(asserting conservatives are not concerned with what happens to embryos during abortion; rather,
they are concerned with how abortion disrupts gender roles in modern society).
314. Id. at 297.
315. See Jessica Valenti, Anti-Abortion Hypocrisy Has Never Been Clearer, GEN (June 13,
2019),
https://gen.medium.com/anti-abortion-hypocrisy-has-never-been-clearer-c7b621db7ab5
[https://perma.cc/2DMV-V6TZ] (quoting a Republican lawmaker’s response to being questioned
about the failure to punish IVF clinics who discard embryos, “The egg in the lab doesn’t apply.
It’s not in a woman. She’s not pregnant.”).
316. See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 338 F.Supp.3d 606, 606 (W.D. Tex.
2018) (scrutinizing Texas’ attempt to implement different standards for IVF clinics and abortion
clinics when fetal tissue is disposed).
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8, which created a new chapter in the Texas Health and Safety Code and
modified the state’s rules for embryonic and fetal tissue disposal.317 The
purported purpose of the new chapter was to express the state’s profound
respect for the life of the unborn by providing for the dignified disposition
of embryonic and fetal tissue remains.318 Four days before the intention
of SB 8 taking effect, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission
(HHSC) published rules necessary to implement the new chapter.319 The
district court found the state chose to distinguish between in vitro tissue
cultures (pre-implantation embryos) and post-implantation embryos.320
The state also drew a line between healthcare facilities and IVF clinics
for the purpose of disadvantaging those healthcare clinics that most
regularly deal with embryonic and fetal tissue remains (i.e., abortion
clinics).321 Texas argued the distinction was rational because the
potential for life is more fully realized after implantation, but the court
stated they could not discern a legitimate state interest in distinguishing
between identical tissue solely because the state believed the tissue in one
context had a greater potential for life.322 “Regardless of a state’s ability
to express respect for potential life, the state may not compel its
philosophical or religious answer concerning the degree of life present in
pre-implantation compared to post-implantation embryos under current
law.”323

317. See id. at 615 (discussing the implementation of Senate Bill 8 and the impacts the bill
has on existing laws in Texas).
318. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 697.001, invalidated by Whole Woman’s
Health v. Smith, 338 F.Supp.3d 606 (2018) (“The purpose of this chapter is to express the state’s
profound respect for the life of the unborn by providing for a dignified disposition of embryonic
and fetal tissue remains.”)
319. See generally 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 138.1–.7 (Tex. Dep’t of State Health Services),
invalidated by Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 338 F.Supp.3d 606 (2018) (listing the various
definitions, rules, and procedures implemented by HHSC in anticipation of Senate Bill 8).
320. See Smith, 338 F.Supp.3d at 641 (noting the state’s decision to distinguish between in
vitro tissue cultures and post-implantation embryos, thereby drawing a line between different types
of facilities handling embryos).
321. See id. at 641–42 (W.D. Tex. 2018) (examining the state’s decision to treat healthcare
facilities different than IVF clinics and the arguments made by the state to support this distinction).
322. See id. (“[T]he Court can discern no legitimate state interests in distinguishing between
identical tissue and thus between the facilities that handle that tissue because the State believes the
tissue in one context previously had a greater potential for life. The philosophical or religious
question of the degree of potential life in an embryo is distinct from the scientific question of
whether tissue is an embryo and had the potential for life.”).
323. Id. at 642.
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If we believe states have an interest at conception, as they often assert,
then there is no difference between the embryo disposed of through IVF
and the embryo disposed of through abortion.324 A woman undergoing
IVF and a woman obtaining an abortion are similarly situated, yet the
latter is subject to strenuous hurdles to accomplish what the former can
accomplish with a signature.325 Therefore, we should classify women
attempting to procure an abortion as a subclass of women subjected to
discrimination.326 A policy that classifies on the basis of gender violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless the state can provide an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for the classification.327 The state must show
the challenged classification (1) serves important governmental
objectives, and (2) the discriminatory means employed are substantially
related to achieving those objectives.328
B. Whether Allowing for the Destruction of Embryos in the Context of
In Vitro Fertilization, But Not in the Context of Abortion, Serves
Important Governmental Objectives
In Maher v. Roe, indigent women brought a suit challenging a
Connecticut regulation prohibiting the funding of abortions that were not
medically necessary.329 Appellees claimed the state must accord equal
treatment to both abortion and childbirth and may not evidence a policy

324. See Wright, supra note 267 (suggesting that if anti-choice protestors truly believed
every fertilized egg is a person, they would be protesting “en masse” because IVF clinics donate
and destruct embryos); see also Valenti, supra note 315 (“There is no difference between a
fertilized egg in a lab and a fertilized egg in a person . . . ”).
325. See Kaplan, supra note 282 (comparing and contrasting the requirements associated
with donating embryos which requires nothing more than signing a form to the requirements of
women seeking an abortion, which requires waiting periods, ultrasounds, and lectures claiming that
personhood begins at conception).
326. See id. (describing the discrimination those seeking an abortion face compared to those
going through IVF treatment).
327. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding the Commonwealth
of Virginia failed to show an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from
citizen-soldier program offered at Virginia military college in violation of equal protection).
328. See id. at 533 (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post
hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”).
329. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977) (summarizing the facts of the suit brought
by two indigent women against the state of Connecticut for restricting Medicare benefits for
abortions in the first trimester to only those deemed medically necessary).
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preference by funding only medical expenses incident to childbirth.330
The Court reasoned a woman’s right to an abortion did not imply a
limitation on a state’s authority to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion.331 According to the Court, Connecticut’s
regulation was rationally related to furthering its interest in encouraging
normal childbirth.332 The Court held that although Connecticut
attempted to make childbirth a more attractive alternative, it had not
imposed any restriction on abortion access.333 But whether the state has
an important governmental interest in promoting childbirth is not the
issue in question.334 Rather, the issue is whether allowing for the
destruction of embryos in the context of IVF but not abortion
accomplishes the government’s objective of protecting potential life.335
It appears the state seems to care about the protection of potential life
only when a woman is seeking an abortion and not in vitro
fertilization.336 Does the state believe some embryos are more valuable
than others, or does the state suggest that so long as one embryo results
in a pregnancy, the excess embryos and their potential for life can be
discarded?337

330. See id. at 470 (advancing the claim to challenge the classification under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
331. See id. at 474 (holding the Connecticut regulation did not place an obstacle to a
women’s access to abortion and did not violate a fundamental right).
332. See id. 464 (“Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State’s strong interest in protecting
the potential life of the fetus.”).
333. See id. 474 (asserting an indigent woman seeking an abortion would not be
disadvantaged by the state’s decision to fund childbirth because she would continue to be dependent
on private sources).
334. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (repeating that the state does have an
important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life), modified, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
335. Cf. id. at 159 (“Texas urges that . . . life begins at conception and is present throughout
the pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from
and after conception.”).
336. Compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
870 (1992) (acknowledging the state’s legitimate interest in promoting and protecting potential life)
with Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (1992) (allowing a Tennessee fertility clinic to destroy
embryos to preserve a spouse’s right not to procreate).
337. See Valenti, supra note 315 (suggesting the latter is true because women seeking IVF
are not subject to mandatory counseling or a forty-eight-hour waiting period for discarding unused
embryos).
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C. Whether Subjecting a Woman Procuring an Abortion to Different
Regulations Than a Woman Seeking IVF is Substantially Related
to the Achievement of the Governmental Objective of Protecting
Potential Life
The state relies on a false premise that it is interested in potential life
in order to regulate abortion.338 But the state’s insistence that it cares
about the potential for life appears to exist only when it suits their
narrative.339 In Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, the state tried to
rationalize their decision to differentiate between pre- and postimplantation tissues when determining whether IVF clinics were subject
to the same regulations as abortion clinics because they believed the
potential for life was more fully realized after implantation.340 But this
differs from what we’ve heard from pro-life proponents in the past.341
Generally, the argument states use to justify interference in the abortion
decision is that they consider human life to be present from the moment
of conception, and this suffices to constitute a compelling state
interest.342 Why, then, are embryos fertilized during IVF less of a
compelling state interest?343 It simply does not follow logically. If the
state asserts an interest at the outset for potential life, then subjecting a
woman obtaining an abortion to different regulations than a woman
seeking IVF—when both result in the destruction of embryos—is not

338. See id. (implying lawmakers don’t care when life begins).
339. See id. (quoting a lawmaker who stated a fertilized egg does not matter when it’s in a
lab because it’s not inside a woman. The writer asserts that the fight to end abortion was never
about when life begins but instead was about controlling women.).
340. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 338 F.Supp.3d 606, 642 (W.D. Tex. 2018)
(“Regardless of a state’s ability to express respect for potential life via dignified disposition,
the State may not compel its philosophical or religious answer concerning the degree of life present
in pre-implantation compared to post-implantation embryos under current law.”).
341. See The Pro-Life Response to the IVF Dilemma, STUDENTS FOR LIFE (July 21, 2019),
https://studentsforlife.org/2019/07/21/the-pro-life-response-to-the-ivf-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/
2MYQ-4DXL] (“A consistent, intellectually-honest stance holds that human life begins at
conception/fertilization, which means that destroying embryos is killing human beings at our very
earliest phase.”).
342. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (reviewing Texas’ argument that a fetus
is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment), modified, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
343. See Valenti, supra note 315 (hinting that the government’s agenda, and to some extent
their governmental objective, isn’t about life, but about forced motherhood and returning to
traditional gender roles).
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substantially related to its objective of protecting potential life.344 If we
permitted states to enact any statute that reasonably furthered its interest
in potential life, and if that interest arose at conception, no statute would
fail to pass constitutional muster.345
D. Whether Women Making the Decision Not to Bear a Child Through
Procuring an Abortion Are Afforded Less Protection Than Those
Deciding to Do the Same Through Contraception or Sterilization
Because the state cannot legitimately claim that it has an interest in
potential life while allowing IVF clinics to destroy embryos, the abortion
decision consisting of whether to bear or beget a child does not differ in
kind from other reproductive and bodily autonomy cases.346 Either the
state claims to have an interest in potential life at the outset and uses that
supposed interest to regulate abortion but not in vitro fertilization
(thereby effectively discriminating against a subclass of women), or it
does not hold the interest in potential life it claims to have, and abortion
should be afforded the designation as a fundamental right alongside
contraception and sterilization.347
CONCLUSION
“Even if the Constitution has taken a holiday during this pandemic, it
cannot become a sabbatical.”348 The COVID-19 crisis continues to this
day and fundamental rights continue to be called into question.349 The
344. See Kaplan, supra note 282 (suggesting that if lawmakers cared about protecting life,
they could promote laws that prevent unwanted pregnancy including insurance coverage for
contraception and comprehensive sex education).
345. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 556 (1989) (“It is impossible to
read the plurality opinion . . . without recognizing its implicit invitation to every State to enact more
and more restrictive abortion laws, and to assert their interest in potential life as of the moment of
conception.”).
346. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839
(1992) (asserting abortion be recognized as sui generis, different in kind than rights protected under
the rubric of family privacy and autonomy).
347. E.g. Kaplan, supra note 282 (suggesting if potential life were truly the legitimate
interest of the state, anti-choice groups would target IVF embryo destruction at the forefront of
their efforts).
348. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020), 141 S.Ct. 63, 70
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
349. See id. (questioning the validity of an executive order restricting religious services due
to the pandemic).
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Court makes clear that while courts are to give the states’ discretion in
determining the mode or manner to enact regulations to protect the public
health and safety, it may not go beyond the necessity of the case and
violate rights secured by the Constitution.350 That is why it is so
important to note the disparity and hypocrisy rooted in a woman’s right
to an abortion.351 The Court in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo acknowledges that Jacobson does not grant a plenary override of
the Constitution, and it clarifies that the proper test to apply when
assessing whether a state has exerted an improper use of its police power
depends on the constitutional right in question.352 And while the
constitutional test for abortion is the undue burden set out in Casey, the
Fifth Circuit was nonetheless able to justify and uphold GA-09 as a
legitimate exertion of a state’s police power despite it constituting more
than an undue burden on a woman.353 GA-09 fully prevented a woman
from obtaining an abortion.354 The constitutional right to an abortion
was not offered the same courtesy or respect that the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment right was given when the Court assessed whether
the state had impeded on that right.355 Instead, the COVID-19 crisis was
a state’s latest attempt in a long line of attacks against a woman’s right to
bodily integrity and autonomy.356 That is why it is so important to note
350. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (finding the regulation in
question necessary to ensure public health and safety and therefore justified).
351. See generally Valenti, supra note 315 (unveiling the disparity in the concern for
embryos in the IVF context as compared to the abortion context).
352. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S.Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(stating Jacobson applied what would become the traditional legal test associated with the right at
issue, thus not stepping away from precedent).
353. See In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 2020) (indicating it is up to the governing
state authorities and not the courts to determine what would be most effective to protect the public
against a public health crisis).
354. See Shannon Najmabadi, Early in the Pandemic, Texas Banned Most Abortions. After
the Ban Lifted, Second-trimester Abortions Jumped, a New Study Shows., TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2021,
2:00
PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/01/04/texas-abortions-coronavirus-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/P43X-F45W] (reporting second-trimester abortions increased sixty-one percent
after the GA-09 expired, likely due to care delays, waiting times, and capacity issues).
355. Compare In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 788–89 (upholding GA-09 as a permissible exercise
of the state’s police powers), with Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S.Ct. at 67 (subjecting
the challenged restriction to strict scrutiny and concluding that although stemming the spread of
COVID-19 was a compelling interest, the regulation could not be regarded as narrowly tailored).
356. Nora Ellmann, State Actions Undermining Abortion Rights in 2020, AMERICAN
PROGRESS (Aug. 27, 2020, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/
2020/08/27/489786/state-actions-undermining-abortion-rights-2020/ [https://perma.cc/3STJ-38
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that the logic behind the state’s position that it has an interest in potential
life is inherently flawed.357 If the state truly cared about the interest in
potential life, it would scorn all women seeking IVF treatment for
discarding and disposing of their unused embryos.358 Instead, it turns a
blind eye and grants her a pass because she fulfills her assigned role of
mother and wife.359 Abortion regulation cannot rest on this false premise
of protection of potential life.360 It is the only argument preventing it
from being afforded the same level of protection as procreation and
contraception.361 It must have its fundamental right designation
reinstated so that it may sit in its rightful place alongside other privacy
and bodily autonomy cases. If abortion was deemed a fundamental right,
as it once was in Roe, the Court would have rightfully asserted that while
a state has broad discretion in regulating abortion, the proper test to apply
is strict scrutiny—subsequently holding GA-09 to be an invalid use of the
state’s police power.362 Instead, the state exploits a public health crisis
and uses it as their latest ploy to attack women’s constitutional right to
abortion.363

5D] (“At the outset of the coronavirus crisis in the United States, 11 governors explicitly excluded
abortion care from the essential services that were allowed to operate amid shutdowns, essentially
manipulating the pandemic response to ban abortion care from being provided in their states.”).
357. E.g. id. (exploring the disproportionate effect of the supposed protection of potential
life when the affected minority communities seeking abortions are the ones suffering from an
already limited access to health care on top of the current pandemic that is harming them
disproportionately).
358. See Valenti, supra note 315 (suggesting the anti-abortion movement’s legislative
apathy toward IVF proves the fight to end abortion was never about when life begins).
359. E.g. id. (“[C]onservative legislators roll back abortion rights while ignoring the
millions of embryos at U.S. clinics that are frozen or destroyed because their agenda is not about
‘life’ but forced motherhood and a return to traditional gender roles.”).
360. See Kaplan, supra note 282 (pointing out the disparity between how the law treats
abortion patients and IVF patients).
361. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839
(1992) (distinguishing abortion from other privacy and autonomy cases).
362. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020), 141 S.Ct. 63,
68 (2020) (evaluating whether the state had shown that public health would be imperiled if less
restrictive measures were imposed).
363. See Glenza, supra note 15 (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio,
Tennessee, and West Virginia as states that categorized abortion services as non-essential).
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